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Abstract
ESSAYS ON CORPORATE DEBT FEATURES, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND CASH
POLICIES
by
XIAOYU ZHU

Advisor: Professor Armen Hovakimian
This dissertation consists of three chapters that span corporate capital structure, debt financing, and cash policies.

Chapter 1 This chapter examines variations in corporate debt features with respect to
changes in macroeconomic and microeconomic conditions. The features seen in corporate
debt issues have evolved substantially over the past four decades in response to changes
in the corporate financing landscape. In particular, this chapter studies the evolution of
active debt provisions such as fixed-price calls, make-whole calls, and callable conversion
features in corporate bond contracts. By integrating corporate bond data from the Mergent
Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) and Securities Data Company (SDC), This chapter
reveals new temporal and cross-sectional patterns in active debt provisions.

Chapter 2 This chapter studies how corporate debt features impact firms’ financing
choices. Deleveraging by reducing debt is costly to shareholders in terms of the value transferred to debtholders and is especially costly in the presence of long-term debt and when
the need to deleverage is high. This chapter provides empirical evidence consistent with this
point of view, and then shows that having fixed-price callable debt helps firms to limit the
value transferred from shareholders to debt holders, thereby mitigating the debt-overhang
problem and reducing deleveraging costs. Make-whole calls, however, induce no such effects
on the speed of a firm’s adjustment toward its optimal debt ratio, supporting the notion of a
iv

wealth transfer mechanism. Consistent with the hypothesis that longer-term debt increases
deleveraging risk while callability mitigates that risk, firms with longer maturity debt tend
to exhibit higher stock returns, but less so in the presence of callable debt.

Chapter 3 This chapter researches how firms’ capital structures and debt features affect
their cash holdings. Prior studies have found strongly negative correlations between firms’
cash holdings and leverage. Various explanations of this relationship have been offered, but
they hardly converge. To reconcile discrepancies, I empirically test the validity of the hypotheses on liquidity and non-liquidity motives. Moreover, I propose a new wealth-transfer
mechanism that contributes to the negative effect of firms’ capital structure on their cash
holdings. Debt features (i.e., fixed-price calls) limit wealth transfer from shareholders to
debtholders and enable firms to hold more cash at lower costs. Implementing economic recession as a plausible shock, my results are robust to cash–leverage sensitivities. Overall, I
find evidence supporting both liquidity and non-liquidity motives in firms’ cash-holding policies. My empirical results agree with explanations including transaction costs, precautionary
measures, strategic actions, and wealth-transfer mechanisms.
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Dissertation Overview
This dissertation includes three chapters of empirical studies in corporate finance. The
chapters focus on how corporate debt features (e.g. maturity structure, corporate bond
provisions) affect firms’ financing behaviors.
The first chapter surveys the evolution of corporate debt features in a time-series manner.
Debt is an essential part of external financing within the US public firms. The chapter offers
a detailed study of the evolvement of corporate debt in US public firms in the recent four
decades. I observe that debt features such as debt maturity structure, capital structure,
active bond provisions, passive bond provisions, and bond covenants experience nontrivial
changes due to both macroeconomical and microeconomical factors. This chapter offers
evidences that debt features have variations in the last four decades. The next two chapters
study how these variations induce changes in corporate financing policies
The second chapter empirically studies how debt maturity structure and fixed-price
callable option affect firms’ adjustment actions in capital structure. The results suggest
that firms’ capital structure decisions are impacted by firms debt features. Specifically, the
debt features include maturity structure and bond provisions. I find that firms with longer
maturity structure adjust slower toward their leverage targets due to increased wealth transfers from shareholders to debtholders. Fixed-price callable options on corporate bonds can
mitigate this wealth transfer thus help increase the speed of adjustments in corporate leverages.
The third chapter empirically tests how firms’ cash holding policies are impacted by
debt financing. I find that total leverage, short-term leverage, and long-term leverage all
have significant negative relationships with firms’ cash holdings, but the magnitudes vary.
Different types of debt relate to firms’ cash holdings under different mechanisms offered by
previous studies, but the conclusions hardly converge. The chapter offers a detailed study of

1

previous documented mechanisms, and I test a new wealth transfer mechanism in the same
argument of the second chapter.
Overall, the three chapters connect each other in the way that all of them contribute
to the research on how debt features and bond provisions affect firms’ financing behaviors,
both internal (cash holdings) and external (capital structure). The conclusion is that debt
features and bond provisions significantly affect internal and external corporate financing.
Detailed results and conclusions are presented in the chapters below.

2

Chapter 1
A Survey of the Evolution of Corporate Debt Features

1.1.

Introduction

The evolution of features associated with U.S. corporate debt issues has attracted attention from financial economists for some time, and various studies have documented the
impact of these debt features on firms’ external financings.1 Various types of bond provisions serve important functions for both issuers and investors in the corporate debt market.
This chapter offers an updated survey of corporate bond provisions, focusing mainly on active provisions within corporate bonds (fixed-price calls, convertibles, make-whole calls, etc.)
that can have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions, in contrast to provisions
such as mandatory sinking funds and bond clawbacks that are more passive in nature
The survey begins with a general review of the U.S. public debt market and shows the
trends in multiple public debt categories, including U.S. Treasury, mortgage-related debt,
corporate debt, etc., and then briefly discuss different types of corporate debt, focusing
primarily on corporate bonds. Evidences are provided on dramatic changes in corporate
bond characteristics over time, including trends in issuance, amounts outstanding, time to
maturity, and other common bond terms and conditions.
Next, a detailed review of corporate bond provisions is provided. The focus is on provisions that offer active decisions on the part of firms and investors. I integrate data from
various sources and observe nontrivial changes in corporate bond provisions over time. Previous finance literature focused on different perspectives regarding the functionality of bond
provisions, and this chapter summarizes those findings here to provide relevant background
1

See, for example, Amore, Caselli, Colla & Corbetta (2019), Choi, Hackbarth & Zechner (2018), Oehmke
& Zawadowski (2017), etc.
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information. First, call options that allow the issuer to call a bond issue at a fixed price
are found to serve the following functions: (1) interest rate hedging (Guntay, Prabhala &
Unal (2004)), (2) moderating underinvestment (Bodie & Taggart (1978)), (3) reducing the
likelihood of risk-shifting (Alderson, Lin & Stock (2017); Barnea, Haugen & Senbet (1980)),
(4) attenuating the effect of asymmetric information (Barnea et al. (1980)), (5) covenant
restriction (Reisel (2014)), and (6) forced conversion (Grundy & Verwijmeren (2018)). Second, make-whole calls serve a purpose similar to fixed-price calls (interest rate, covenant
restriction, forced conversion, and financial flexibility). Third, convertible bonds offer the
following implications (1) risk shifting (Green (1984); Jensen & Meckling (1979)), (2) risk
estimation (Brennan & Schwartz (1980)), (3) asymmetric information (Stein (1992)), and (4)
sequential financing (Schultz (1993)). Details regarding these mechanisms are provided in
the following section. This chapter also offers a brief survey regarding the passive provisions
in some corporate bonds including sinking funds and bond clawbacks.
Another important characteristic of corporate bonds is covenants. Previous studies have
established connections between firm characteristics and bond covenants (Zhang & Zhou
(2018); Cook, Fu & Tang (2014); Billett, King & Mauer (2007); Malitz (1986)). They
find that the use of bond covenants is sensitive to firm size, growth opportunities, leverage,
debt maturity, and liquidity. However, the observed time-series trend, an upward-facing ‘W’
shape, has been less studied, especially the combined effect of covenants and active bond
provisions. I observe discrete time-series sensitivities of combinations of covenants and bond
provisions that suggest potential topics for future research.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys overall U.S. debt market trends.
Section 3 presents an overview of U.S. corporate debt financing, and a detailed survey of
corporate debt provisions. Section 4 includes findings in corporate debt covenants. Section
5 presents discoveries on bond actions. Section 6 concludes.
‘

4

1.2.

Overview of Debt Financing

Debt is an essential part of the U.S. capital markets. Various studies analyze U.S. debt
markets in response to interest rates, taxes, and fiscal policies. For example, Blanchard
(2019) discusses how fiscal and welfare of debt change in an economy where fast interest
rate is less than the economy growth rate. Bohn (1998) studies how governments react to
the rising outstanding amount of debt. Barro (1979) documents the optimal tax policies
on debt issuance under the Ricardian invariance theorem. Over the last four decades, the
total amount of debt outstanding has grown fairly consistently, reaching 42.86 trillion USD
at the end of 2018, comparing to 1.93 trillion USD in 1980, for an average annual growth
rate of 8.5%.2 Figure 1.1 shows trends in the amount outstanding of various types of U.S.
debt instruments. Among these debt instruments, U.S. Treasury, mortgage-related debt,
and corporate debt are the three largest in terms of amounts outstanding, followed by municipal debt, federal agency securities, asset-backed securities, and money market debt. U.S.
Treasury debt was the largest category during the periods 1980 – 1999 and 2008 – 2018.
Mortgage-related debt was the largest segment during the period 1999 – 2008. There were
large changes in the amounts of U.S. Treasury and mortgage-related debt pre- and post-2018.
The amount of corporate debt outstanding, on the other hand, has grown fairly consistently
over time and is less sensitive to economic cycles. By the end of 2018, the U.S. Treasury
market comprised 36.42% of total debt outstanding. The percentages for mortgage-related
and corporate debt are 22.71% and 21.54%, respectively. The U.S. Treasury market showed
modest growth before 2008, growing at an average of 7.60% annually. After the 2008 financial crisis, the amount of U.S. Treasuries outstanding increased by 11.92%. Mortgage-related
debt grew by 17.85% per year in the pre-2008 period but that growth rate dropped to 0.25%
in the post-2018 period.
Figure 1.2 shows trends in issuance for different types of debt securities. The largest
2

SIFMA Fixed Income Data. https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/fixed-income-chart/
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amounts of issuances accredit to mortgage-related debt before 2008, and US Treasure afterwards. Issuance for some debt instruments is more highly correlated with macroeconomics
cycles due to tighter versus looser liquidity in recession years compared to non-recession
years. There was a sudden increase in U.S. Treasury issuance during the period 2008-2009,
from 1,029.4 billion USD to 2,197.2 billion USD, due to the increase government spending
to fight the financial crisis. Issuance of federal agency securities increased over the same
period, but to a lesser degree. Municipal debt showed almost no change during this period.
Issuance for other types of debt declined over this period at different rates. Mortgage-related
debt and asset-backed securities issuance experienced sharp drops due to the subprime loan
crisis. Another noticeable trend is the sharp decrease in mortgage-related securities issuance.
Peaking in 2003 at about 3,500 billion USD, mortgage- related securities issuance dropped
to less than 1,500 billion USD in 2008.
Figure 1.3 shows the credit ratings of outstanding debt in the U.S. Issuance within the
highest rating categories, AAA, AA, and A, graded ratings has declined overall in the last
three decades. AAA-rated debt has been scarce since 2010, while AA-rated debt has declined
to almost half of the amount outstanding in the early 1980s and 1990s. Issuance of A-rated
debt has remained relatively constant. In contrast, the amount of BBB-rated and BB-rated
debt in the market has increased. BB-rated debt in particular has become a substantial
portion of the outstanding debt in the public debt market. Lower rated debt increasing over
time is due to increasing debt issuances by new borrowers, in agreement with studies such
as Graham and Leary (2018) and Falato et al. (2013). Other reasons that such portion
becomes higher include weaker collateral and larger MA activities.3
To summarize, the debt market in the US has been expanding over the past 30+ years.
Macroeconomic factors drive trends in the types of debt instruments and issuance. US Treasuries, mortgage-related debt, and corporate debt are the top three types of debt instruments
3

See articles, for example, https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/flurry-of-us-igbond-issuance-replaces-cp-at-higher-cost-08-04-2020
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outstanding, and lower rated debt has claimed a higher proportion of the debt market in the
last few decades.

1.3.
1.3.1.

Corporate Debt and Debt Features
Corporate Debt Overview

Debt financing remains an important source of capital for corporations. Early studies
include Weston (1955) research on the financing choices of U.S. public firms. Data from
Compustat indicate that on average, 87% of US public firms have debt on their balance
sheets, and within that group, debt comprises 28% of firms’ external financing. Many studies
have proposed theories as to why firms hold debt, and how much debt firms should hold. The
mainstream literature in this area includes the trade-off theory (Modigliani & Miller (1963);
Kraus (1973)), the pecking order theory (Myers (1984)) and the market timing theory (Baker
& Wurgler (2002)).
Figure 1.4 shows trends in U.S. public firms’ total leverage, short-term leverage, and
long-term leverage . Leverage increased in the 1980s, followed by an approximately twentyyear deleveraging period. DeAngelo, Gonçalves & Stulz (2018) discuss this trend in detail.
After the 2008 financial crisis, leverage increased again. Long-term leverage has a higher
correlation with firms’ total leverage over time than short-term leverage, indicating that the
majority of a firm’s debt is long-term (maturing in more than a year).
A great deal of previous research has focused on the different types of debt used by
corporations, including commercial paper, lines of credit, bank loans, and corporate bonds
. Commercial paper is a short-term debt instrument that firms, primarily in the investment
grade, can issue to raise funding. These types of short-term borrowings are often considered
as a substitute for cash holdings and allow firms quick access to the debt market. Studies
on commercial papers start with early journals such as Crum (1923) which researches the
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interest rate cycles of commercial papers. Recent studies by Kahl, Shivdasani & Wang (2015)
and Kacperczyk & Schnabl (2010) summarize that commercial paper are primarily issued
by large firms which consists of one third market capitalization of Compustat firms.
A line of credit offers firms further short-term liquidity. Holmström & Tirole (1998)
is among the first cluster of research that discuss the function of short-term liquidity in
accordance to information asymmetry problem. The first theoretic model is proposed by
Boot, Thakor & Udell (1991). The model justifies banks as an organizational solution in
market crisis, implementing unenforceable contracts. Recent papers such as Acharya, Eisert,
Eufinger & Hirsch (2019), Jeanne & Korinek (2019), and Caballero, Farhi & Gourinchas
(2020) focus on how short-term liquidity tools such as line of credit affect firms’ financing
policies after the financial crisis. Papers such as Lins, Servaes & Tufano (2010) discuss line
of credit uses in an international setting.
Bank loans can be a substantial part of a company’s debt financing. Diamond (1984)
proposes a fundamental theory that links banks’ monitoring functions to firms’ risks. A
number of studies have focused on how banks can better monitor firms and mitigate information asymmetries by issuing bank loans (Crouzet (2018); Morellec, Valta & Zhdanov
(2015); Strahan (1999)). Another strand of research studies the variations in the amounts
of bank loans used across U.S. public firms. (Ippolito, Ozdagli & Perez-Orive (2018); Li,
Purda & Wang (2018); Denis & Mihov (2003)). Adrian, Colla & Song Shin (2013) document
a macroeconomic effect after the financial crisis in 2007-2008 period, when firms reduced
their use of bank loans and increased corporate bond issuance to maintain a similar level of
long-term debt compared to the pre-crisis period.
Corporate bonds comprise an important part of debt financing for large U.S. corporations.
Figure 1.5 presents the total number of firms and the number of firms that issued bonds
each year, based on data from Mergent/FISD and SDC Global Issuance. The number of
public firms in the U.S. increased from 1980 to 1998, peaking at almost 5,000 firms, then
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decreased thereafter, to about 3,000 firms in 2018. In contrast to the fluctuations in the total
number of publicly held firms in the U.S., the number of firms that issue corporate bonds
has remained fairly constant, representing an increasingly larger proportion of total firms,
which is consistent with Adrian et al. (2013). Figure 1.6 shows the amount of corporate
bond issuance over time. A sharp increase begins in the mid-1990s and continues through
2017. The amount issued in 2017 was 700 billion USD. The amounts in 1980 dollars are
lower in magnitude, but the pattern is qualitatively similar.
One interesting trend is that average debt maturities have decreased to almost half of the
level at the beginning of the study period. Figure 1.7 shows the trend in bond maturities
over time. The decrease begins prior to 2000, moving from 20+ years to 10+ years. The
average maturity after 2000 remains relatively constant at 10 years. There has been a slight
increase in average maturity in recent years, but the magnitude of the increase is small. To
summarize, firms now use more corporate bonds as their source of long-term debt financing
than they did decades ago. More firms issue corporate bonds as a percentage of total firms,
and issue higher amounts of bonds. Corporate bond maturities have decreased over the last
forty years, mostly over the period from 1980 to 2000.

1.3.2.

Bond Provisions

Bond provisions serve important functions for issuers and investors. This chapter focuses
mainly on active provisions, namely fixed-price call options, make-whole calls, and convertible options. Other provisions, including sinking funds and bond clawbacks, will be briefly
discussed in this section.
Figure 1.8 shows the number of corporate debt issues with active provisions and Figure
1.9 shows the corresponding percentages. A majority of corporate bonds issued were straight
bonds (bonds that do not have active provisions) in the 1990s, followed by a decreasing trend.
Straight convertible bonds have remained a low percentage of total issuance over the time
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period analyzed, except for the period from 2005 to 2007. Convertible bond issuance spiked
before the financial crisis of 2008, but thereafter fewer straight convertible bonds were issued.
Fixed-price callable debt issuance was relatively high in the 1980s and 1990s. In the early
1980s, the majority of bonds contained fixed-price call options, but the percentage decreased
sharply over the next thirty years. Straight bonds, straight callable bonds and straight
convertibles bonds have lost their appeal in the past two decades.
Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11 show a dramatic increase in the issuance of bonds with more
than one provision. Corporate bond provisions became more complicated with multiple
provisions in the same issue. The most noticeable trend is the increase in make-whole
calls. A make-whole call is a provision that grants the firm the option to call the bond
at the higher of par value or the present value of the remaining cash flows on the bond
discounted by the current market yield. The percentage of debt issues that contain makewhole calls increased significantly in the 2000s, becoming the majority of the bonds issued
in the U.S. bond market. Callable convertible bonds reached peak issuance in the mid2000s, then sharply declined. Studies including Grundy & Verwijmeren (2018) document
that hedge funds pursued convertible bond arbitrage in the early 2000s. The hedge funds
bought convertible debt issued by a firm and short the firms’ stock. This arbitrage strategy
offers bond-like yields when the firm’s equity value increases, and the short side of the trade
profits when the firm’s share price decreases. They find that hedge funds pay higher prices
for non-callable convertible bonds. Convertible make-whole bonds show an increasing trend,
but the total issuance and percentages are relatively low.

1.3.3.

Fixed-Price Calls and Make-Whole Calls

This section discusses the literature on fixed-price calls and make-whole calls. A bond
with a fixed-price call option allows the firm to pay a fixed price to call the bond. Firms
benefits from calling a bond when the call option is in the money. Usually a call protection
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period is included, during which firms cannot call the bonds, ensuring a certain yield to
bondholders. Figure 1.12 shows the average call protection period by year of issuance.
There is a decreasing trend of call protection periods from 1980 to early 2010s, then a large
increase in the mid-2010s. The average call protection period decreased from 90 months in
1980 to approximately 40 months in 2010, consistent with the shorter average bond maturity.
Based on Lehman Brothers’ fixed income database, between 1973 to 1996 there were a
total of 5,009 firms that had issued 32,295 bonds. Among those bonds were 12,509 callable
bonds and 8,888 bonds with no call provisions. Duffie & Singleton (1999) point out that the
majority of dollar-dominated corporate bonds at that time were callable. One reason that
firms issue callable bonds is to hedge interest rate risk. When interest rates decline, firms
can call back the bonds and refinance them by issuing new bonds with lower coupon rates.
Mauer (1993) shows that after taking transaction costs into consideration, firms wait for a
low interest rate environment to call their bonds to ensure profitability. The optimal interest
rate is negatively correlated to “both the drift and volatility of the interest rate process and
the call price”. In return, investors who purchase callable bonds receive higher coupons than
those who purchase non-callable bonds.
It would appear that call provisions do not provide the firm with any benefit due to the
premium paid to investors. Research has documented that callable bonds may be used to
reduce agency costs. Myers (1977) shows that bonds options can be used to mitigate agency
problems, especially with lower quality debt issuance. Bodie & Taggart (1978) shows that call
provisions on long-term bonds could strengthen a firm’s incentive to invest because the firm
could renegotiate the terms of its debt by calling its bonds, and the growth opportunity gives
the shareholders a preference for using call provision. Callable debt helps to mitigate the
underinvestment problem and reduces risk shifting. Barnea et al. (1980) echo previous studies
by presenting a theoretical model in which call provisions and debt maturity structures would
solve agency problems associated with informational asymmetry, managerial risk incentives,
and forgone growth opportunities. Banko & Zhou (2010) find that callable bonds are issued
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by firms that have both information asymmetries and underinvestment problems. Another
explanation for callable bond issuance is that they can signal a firm’s better prospects in the
presence of asymmetric information. Robbins & Schatzberg (1986) shows that both shortterm bonds and callable bonds can signal a firm’s better prospects, but that short-term
bonds do so at a cost of weakened risk-sharing with capital markets.
One strand of research focus on the challenging job of valuing callable bonds, which
requires the knowledge of a firm’s total value and its dynamic liability structure, which
are usually unobservable to outsiders. Moreover, it is hard to incorporate market frictions
into valuing callable bonds. Computationally, valuing callable bonds is challenging. Jarrow
& Turnbull (1995) use a stochastic process for the default-free term structure and for the
exogenous risky debt term structure to value options across a term structure of bonds. Duffie
& Singleton (1999) show the reduced-form model to price contingent claims with default
risk present. Other computational papers include Jones, Mason & Rosenfeld (1984), Berndt
(2004), Acharya & Carpenter (2002), and Jarrow, Li, Liu & Wu (2010).
Make-whole call provisions in corporate bonds offer a call option but not at a fixed
price. Make-whole calls cover a specified period of time during which firms can execute the
call option. Figure 1.13 shows the duration of the average make-whole period over time.
Since there are an extremely limited number of make-whole callable bonds issued before
2000, the trend is assumed be more reliable after 2000. The make-whole period is, on
average, 110 months. Typically, the make-whole period starts immediately after the bond
is issued. In other cases, issues remain non-callable before the make-whole period starts.
After the make-whole period ends, the make-whole call turns into a fixed-price call at a predetermined callable price. This property of make-whole callable debt provides an important
counterfactual setting utilized in Section 2 and Section 3 of this dissertation.
The make-whole call literature is relatively new and limited. Mann & Powers (2003)
provide survey results showing that 69% of the firms that issue make-whole callable bonds
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agree with the statement that make-whole calls grant firms better financial flexibility, in the
sense that the make-whole call option benefits firms by allowing them to repurchase debt at
the firm’s discretion. Managers also agree with the fact that they prefer make-whole calls
with a lower cost compared to fixed-price calls.
Mann & Powers (2003) find that make-whole provisions offer a yield premium of 11.2 bps
relative to comparable straight bonds. Powers & Tsyplakov (2008) propose an asset-pricing
model for make-whole calls. They conclude that given transaction costs and market frictions,
the premium offered on the make-whole callable debt does not exceed 5.4 bps. Powers &
Sarkar (2013) showed that 15 percent of the credit spread is due to the make-whole callable
debt premium. In a noteworthy study, Alderson et al. (2017) compare fixed-price calls and
make-whole calls in the context of the agency cost of debt. Barnea et al. (1980) theorized
that fixed-price calls mitigate underinvestment problems by limiting the increase in value of
outstanding debt. Make-whole calls, however, do not offer this benefit since the call price
is, at a minimum, the net present value of the bond’s future payments discounted by the
current market interest rate. They find that firms are more sensitive to changes in the value
of options embedded in their debt issues when agency costs arise. The results presented in
the second and third sections of this dissertation echo those findings.

1.3.4.

Convertible Bond Literature

Convertible bonds can be converted into a pre-specified number of shares of the issuing
firm’s stock. According to Compustat data, convertible debt consistently represents 2%-3%
of the total amount of corporate debt outstanding, and more than 10% of all companies have
convertible debt exceeding 30% of their outstanding total debt, during the year 1980-2018.
Essig (1991) shows similar results based on data covering the period 1963-1984. The reasons
firms issue convertible debt can be categorized as follows.
(1) Post-issuance risk-shifting: Jensen & Meckling (1979) discuss the use of convertible
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securities and warrants, arguing that warrants represent claims on the upper tail of the
distribution of stock returns, while convertible bonds allow bondholders to share part of the
proceeds associated with a shift in the distribution of returns with existing shareholders. This
is desirable for convertible bondholders because when the stock price rises sufficiently, they
can convert their bonds to equity, thus transferring wealth from bondholders to themselves
in the role of shareholder, and managers would suffer fewer agency costs. Green (1984)
studies the use of convertible bonds to control incentives that are distorting, showing that
using convertible bonds reduces the manager’s incentive to reduce risk and, in some cases,
results in management automatically maximizing shareholder value.
(2) Risk estimation: Brennan & Kraus (1987) showed that theoretically, a firm issues
convertible bonds to reveal the riskiness of the firm by setting the conversion ratio. Brennan
& Schwartz (1988) showed that only companies with a high cost of debt (high risks) would
want to issue convertible debt; large, mature companies should not issue convertible debt.
Issuing convertible bonds is seen as a way to achieve low-cost financing because convertible
bonds seem somewhat insensitive to a company’s risk. Brennan & Schwartz (1988) find
that “...companies issuing convertible bonds tend to be characterized by higher market and
earnings variability, higher business and/or financial risk, stronger growth-orientations, and
shorter corporate histories than their straight debt counterparts Such companies stand to
benefit most from convertible financing.”
(3) Asymmetric information: Constantinides & Grundy (1989) developed a model to
allow management to signal information to the market via its choices regarding the level of
investment and bond type. Their model shows that under a fixed investment level, issuing
equity or straight debt cannot lead to a fully revealing equilibrium (in which outsiders know
the type of risks the firm faces), but issuing a non-callable convertible bond can. Stein
(1992) demonstrates that issuing convertible bonds is attractive in that it mitigates the
negative information consequences of issuing equity and the financial distress cost of issuing
straight bonds. Convertible bond issues usually have fewer negative issuance effects than a
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comparably sized equity issue. Highly levered, high-volatility firms are the primary issuers
of convertible bonds.
(4) Sequential financing: Schultz (1993) found that firms tend to sell additional shares
of stock in the future at the exercise price of its convertible bonds. This type of sequential offering reduces agency costs of issuing stock. Sahlman (1990) provides evidence that
warrants are issued under venture capital arrangements, with equity provided sequentially.
Mayers (1998)suggested that convertible bonds are used as solutions to the sequential financing problem. Convertible bonds can potentially reduce issue costs (conversion features
retain funds in the firm and reduce leverage when the conversion option is in the money)
and control overinvestment problem (returning funds to bondholders when investment options are not valuable). Mayers (1998) showed that around the convertible bond’s call or
conversion date, firms undertake a large amount of new investment and new financing.

1.3.5.

Sinking-Fund Provision and Bond Clawbacks

This section reviews the literature on the passive provisions seen in some corporate bonds,
specifically in terms of sinking-fund provision and bond clawbacks.
A sinking-fund provision requires a firm to retire part of a bond issue periodically by
calling the bond at par (typically) or buying them in the open market. A sinking-fund
provision is among the most commonly used provisions in municipal bonds. In the sample,
approximately 2% of the bonds have sinking-fund provision. Early studies, including Jen
& Wert (1966), Geske (1977), and Dyl & Joehnk (1979), focus on the amortization feature
of sinking funds, under which the firm is required to retire the requisite proportion of debt
via a sinking fund call. Ho & Singer (1984) studied risky sinking fund debt and emphasized
the delivery options. They show that value of a delivery option depends on the firm’s risk,
the sinking-fund’s amortization rate, and the initial yield to maturity. Dunn & Spatt (1984)
used an explicit game in which the price obtained for bonds sold can depend on the size of
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the investors’ position. They concluded that it is incorrect to view sinking-fund bonds as
being equivalent to serial bonds. Mitchell (1991) stated that firms facing an asymmetrically
informed market would favor short-term or medium-term callable debt, with or without a
sinking-fund feature, while firms that do not face an asymmetrically informed market would
favor long-term, callable sinking-fund bonds. Wu (1993) proposed a model that shows the
sinking-fund amortization rate is used to signal the quality of a firm under information
asymmetry. The empirical results in this chapter support that model’s predictions that
better credit quality firms use higher amortization rates in their sinking-fund bond issues.
A clawback provision enables firms to repurchase a debt issue with the proceeds of a
subsequent equity offering. Goyal, Gollapudi & Ogden (1998) stated that clawback provisions
are more prevalent in debt issued by private firms, unregulated firms, and firm with relatively
low levels of tangible, liquid assets. Daniels, Ejara & Vijayakumar (2009) concluded that
bond clawbacks tend to be used by smaller firms with low credit ratings and low profitability.
They also find that a debt issue with a clawback provision trades at a higher yield than
comparable callable bonds, which trade at higher yields than straight bonds. Clawback
bonds can mitigate information asymmetry problems and enable smaller firms to gain access
to the public bond markets.

1.4.

Covenants

Covenants protect investors from management misconduct, and there has been an increasing trend in bond covenants in the past decade. Figure 1.14 shows the percentage of
corporate debt with covenants over time. There was an increasing trend prior to 1990, followed by a decreasing trend that lasted until 2008. After 2008, a majority of bonds have
been issued with covenants.
Integrating covenants with corporate bond provisions, I obverse that the trends on different bonds with single provision or multiple provisions to be increasing over the sample
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years (Figure 1.15 and Figure 1.16). Straight bonds and fixed-price calls did not exhibit a
downward trend over the period from 1990 to 2008. Firms that issue fixed-price callable
bonds and straight bonds included covenants in those bonds, with the percentage remaining
high (80%-90%) over that period, compared to an average of 70%.
Second, almost all bonds with make-whole calls are issued with covenants. Since the
introduction of make-whole calls in 1990, an average of 95% of make-whole bonds are issued
with covenants. This percentage is consistent across all periods.
Patterns with respect to covenants and call options track closely, with incentives, and
including these features in bond issues can be explained from both the demand side and
supply side. Investors prefer more protection when purchasing bonds with call options
because when firms call back the bonds it reduces the return to the investor. In this case,
covenants can serve as a protection mechanism for investors. For the issuing firms, call option
can help them to escape onerous covenants, especially when financial distress risk is high.
Firms with more severe agency problems are expected to issue bonds with more covenants.
Literature on bond covenants can be separated into the following strands. Studies such
as Cook et al. (2014) and Nash, Netter & Poulsen (2003) documented how covenants are
implemented with respect to different firm characteristics. Chava, Wang & Zou (2019) studied how covenants reduce the agency cost of managerial discretion. Additional evidence is
found in Zhang & Zhou (2018) who studied bond covenants and institutional block holdings.
Qi, Roth & Wald (2011) studied bond covenants in an international setting and found that
covenants are more likely to be used in countries with stronger shareholder rights and higher
levels of corporate governance.

1.5.

Actions on Bonds

Given certain provisions, how often are actions actually taken? For example, what percentage of callable debt is called? Figure 1.17 provides an answer. The first figure shows
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that the percentage of callable debt that is called has declined recently. In 1980s a large
proportion of callable debt was called, but the trend has been decreasing since 1990s. An
average of 30 percent of callable debt is called back. One reason so many bonds were called
in the mid- to late 1980s is because interest rates had been so high prior to that time, when
rates started to come down companies were eager to finance at lower rates. When rates are
steady, there are fewer opportunities for companies to save money by calling their bonds.
The right part of the graph suffers from right-truncated problem, as many bonds issued after
2010 had not matured at the time the data was analyzed. On the other hand, convertible
bonds have been converted more often in recent years. The conversion rate was low before
1990, then sharply increased in the 1990s. Conversion is subject to economic cycles; there
are fewer conversions during a recession when stock prices are generally low.
To mitigate the right-truncated problem, I include only bonds that mature no later than
2018, as shown in Figure 1.18. Here, the right-hand side of the graph suffers from smallsample bias, and most of the bonds on the right-hand side of the graph have low maturity (a
bond that is issued in 2016 and matures in 2018 has only 2 years of maturity). However, the
decline in percentage of called bonds disappears in the second graph. I observe a relatively
consistent called bond percentage of 30%. Convertible bonds seem to have lower conversion
ratios comparing to the previous figure. In summary, the general trend is fewer calls and
more conversions.
It is also worth noting how long it takes firms and investors to call or convert their
bonds. Figure 1.19 shows a decreasing trend in terms of the length of time it takes firms
call back the bonds, and the time it takes investors to convert. Initially, the average amount
of time before firms called their callable bonds was approximately 12 years, and the time
for investors to convert was similar. However, in recent years firms have been calling their
bonds more quickly, after an average of five years, while investors usually convert two years
after the convertible bond is issued. The conversion of the convertible bonds follows closely
to the rise of the equity market.
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1.6.

Conclusion

Corporate debt provisions have evolved substantially over the past four decades in response to shifts in the corporate financing landscape. I examined variations in corporate
debt features with respect to changes in macroeconomic and microeconomic conditions and
observed a general trend of an increasing amount of corporate debt issuance, while the average debt maturity decreased from 20 years to 10 years over the past four decades. The
number of bonds with speculative-grade credit ratings has increased notably over the last
two decades.
Call options are the most frequently used provisions in corporate bonds. The trend
has shifted from fixed-price calls to make-whole calls over the time period studied. The
percentage of convertible provisions remains low. I observed that more bonds have been
issued with covenants over the past decade, and that the time it takes firms and investors
to call or convert their bonds has decreased over that time.
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Figure 1.1. US Debt Outstanding Amount
This figure presents different types of US public debt outstanding amounts from 1980 to
2018. The figure includes municipal debt, US Treasury, mortgage-related debt, corporate
debt, federal agency securities, money market instruments, and asset-backed debt. Debt
amounts are in billions of dollars.
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Figure 1.2. US Debt Issuance Amount
This figure presents different types of US public debt issuance amounts from 1996 to 2018.
The figure includes municipal debt, US Treasury, mortgage-related debt, corporate debt,
federal agency securities, money market instruments, and asset-backed debt. Debt amounts
are in billions of dollars.
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Figure 1.3. Debt Ratings
This figure presents the percentages of different rated debt in the US market. The bond
ratings follow SP 500 bond rating criteria.
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Figure 1.4. US Public Firms Leverages Trends
This figure presents the leverages trends of US public firms from 1980 to 2018. ST Leverage is
firms’ short-term debt divided by total assets. LT Leverage is firms’ long-term debt divided
by total assets. Short-term debt is debt maturing within one year, and long-term debt is
debt maturing more than one year. Total Leverage is the sum of firms’ short-term leverage
and long-term leverage.
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Figure 1.5. US Public Firm Number and Bond Issuance Number
This figure presents US public firm number and corporate bond issuance number from 1980
to 2018. Firm number is from Compustat and bond issuance number is from Mergent/FISD.
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Figure 1.6. US Public Firm Bond Issuance Amount
This figure presents amount of bond issued by US public firms from 1980 to 2018. I matched
Compustat firms with bond issuance from Mergent/FISD. The numbers are in billions. The
CPI-adjusted amount is also presented.
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Figure 1.7. US Corporate Bond Maturity Trend
This figure presents the US coporate bond maturity trend from 1980 to 2018. Maturities of
US corporate bonds are aquired from Mergent/FISD. The numbers are in years.
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Figure 1.8. US Corporate Bond Issuance Number with Single Provision
This figure presents numbers of US corporate bonds issued with single provision from 1980
to 2018. Bond provision information is acquired from Mergent/FISD. Straight bonds (grey),
straight callable bonds (blue) and straight convertible bonds (orange) are presented in this
figure.
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Figure 1.9. US Corporate Bond Issuance Percentage with Single Provision
This figure presents percentages of US corporate bonds issued with single provision from
1980 to 2018. Bond provision information is acquired from Mergent/FISD. Straight bonds
(grey), straight callable bonds (blue) and straight convertible bonds (orange) are presented
in this figure.
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Figure 1.10. US Corporate Bond Issuance Numbers with Multiple Provisions
This figure presents numbers of US corporate bonds issued with multiple provisions from
1980 to 2018. Bond provision information is acquired from Mergent/FISD. Convertible
and make-whole (grey), callable and convertible (blue) and callable and make-whole bonds
(orange) are presented in this figure.
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Figure 1.11. US Corporate Bond Issuance Percentages with Multiple Provisions
This figure presents numbers of US corporate bonds issued with multiple provisions from
1980 to 2018. Bond provision information is acquired from Mergent/FISD. Convertible
and make-whole (grey), callable and convertible (blue) and callable and make-whole bonds
(orange) are presented in this figure.
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Figure 1.12. Call Option Protection Period
This figure presents the call protection periods from 1980 to 2018. Call option protection
period on US public bonds information is acquired from SDC Global Bond Issuance Dataset.
The numbers are in month.
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Figure 1.13. Make Whole Provision Period
This figure presents the make-whole periods from 1980 to 2018. The data are acquired from
Mergent/FISD. The numbers are in month.
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Figure 1.14. Percentage of US Corporate Bonds Issued with Covenants
This figure presents the percentages of US corporate bonds issued with covenants from 1980
to 2018. The data are acquired from Mergent/FISD.
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Figure 1.15. Percentage of US Corporate Bonds Issued with Covenants and Single
Provision
This figure presents the percentages of US corporate bonds issued with covenants and single
provision from 1980 to 2018. The data are acquired from Mergent/FISD.
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Figure 1.16. Percentage of US Corporate Bonds Issued with Covenants and Multiple Provisions
This figure presents the percentages of US corporate bonds issued with covenants and multiple provisions from 1980 to 2018. The data are acquired from Mergent/FISD.
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Figure 1.17. Percentages of Bonds Called or Converted
This figure presents percentages of bonds called or converted from 1980 to 2018. The data
are acquired from Mergent/FISD.
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Figure 1.18. Percentages of Bonds Called or Converted (Truncated)
This figure presents percentages of bonds called or converted from 1980 to 2018. The data
are acquired from Mergent/FISD. The data is truncated on the right. Bonds in the figure
have maturity no later than 2018.
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Figure 1.19. Action Period on Bonds
This figure presents the action period on US corporate bonds from 1980 to 2018. The actions
include calling and converting. The data are acquired from Mergent/FISD.
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Chapter 2
Corporate Deleveraging: The Impact of Debt Maturity
Structure and Callable Debt

2.1.

Introduction

The static tradeoff theory of capital structure suggests that firms balance the benefits
and costs of debt financing to achieve an optimal capital structure. Debt financing offers
tax benefits but also causes costs associated with financial distress (see Figure 2.1). In the
finance literature, there is abundant research regarding the existence of an optimal amount
of leverage (Modigliani & Miller (1963); Kraus (1973); Graham & Harvey (2001)).
Despite a seemingly straightforward cost-benefit analysis, researchers in corporate finance have found the static tradeoff theory to be insufficient in explaining firms’ financing
behaviors. Empirical results show that firms rarely maintain their predicted targeted capital
structure. The dynamic tradeoff theory proposes that, instead of immediately addressing deviations from a targeted level of debt financing, firms move toward their leverage targets less
frequently given the presence of adjustment costs related to capital structure. A large body
of research on capital structure provides substantial evidence that firms do move toward targeted debt ratios (Hovakimian, Opler & Titman (2001); Flannery & Rangan (2006)). Yet,
most of the evidence suggests that these adjustments are relatively slow (Chang & Dasgupta
(2009)), raising questions about the economic importance of a target capital structure relative to other theories such as the pecking order theory (Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999)) and
the theory of market timing of new security issues (Baker & Wurgler (2002)).
One interpretation for empirical estimates of the low speed of adjustment (hereafter SOA)
to a targeted debt ratio is that a firm may tolerate deviations from its target if the ratios
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stay within a target zone. The width of such a target zone would be a function of the size
of the adjustment costs relative to the benefits of adjusting to the target. Firms with higher
net adjustment costs (costs of adjustment minus benefits of adjustment) have wider target
zones, and thus adjust more slowly toward their targets (see Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3). In
this chapter, the focus is specifically on the costs of deleveraging to achieve a target debt
ratio and the features of corporate capital structure that can affect those costs.
Ever since Modigliani and Miller’ research incorporating bankruptcy costs in determining
the optimal level of debt (1963) it has been recognized that excess leverage can hurt firm
value because it is associated with higher expected bankruptcy costs. Myers (1977) showed
that over-levered firms with sizable investment opportunities may incur increasing costs well
before they actually go bankrupt. This is because investments in low-risk, value-increasing
projects benefit existing creditors. These benefits are effective transfers of value from shareholders to creditors. When existing debt is very risky the value transfers can be substantial,
creating incentives for shareholders to forego low-risk, value-increasing investments and reducing the firm’s value.
In principle, the potential for underinvestment due to this effect (dubbed the “debt
overhang” in the literature) should create a strong deleveraging incentive for a firm with
excessive leverage. However, the same incentives that may lead firms to shy away from lowrisk, value-increasing projects also make them reluctant to reduce leverage, because such
reductions increase the value of the remaining risky debt and result in a transfer of value
from shareholders to creditors (Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig & Pfleiderer (2018)).
In this chapter, I use a partial-adjustment model to test two important implications of
Myers (1977) theory and its extensions regarding the propensity of over-levered firms to
deleverage. The first implication is that all other things being equal, firms with more longterm debt should exhibit a slower rate of adjustment to a target debt ratio. This is because
long-term debt holders are the primary beneficiaries of value transfers from shareholders
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(Barnea et al. (1980); Chaderina, Weiss & Zechner (2018)). As a result, the wealth transfers,
and hence the cost of deleveraging, are larger for firms with a higher fraction of long-term
debt outstanding.
The second implication is that ceteris paribus, the negative effect of long-term debt on
the SOA should be smaller for firms with more callable debt. This is because the call option
feature effectively caps any increase in bond price at the level at which the bond can be
called (Bodie & Taggart (1978); Barnea et al. (1980)). This ceiling on the price of callable
bonds effectively limits the value transfer from shareholders to creditors that occurs when
a firm reduces its leverage. As a result, ceteris paribus, firms with callable debt as part of
their long-term debt have a greater propensity to deleverage.
Consistent with these predictions, I find that firms with more long-term debt in their
capital structures demonstrate a lower SOA than firms with less long-term debt. In the
presence of callable debt, the reduction in SOA is less pronounced. I find the effects of
long-term debt and callable debt on SOA to be significant and substantial.
Another test to conduct is to separate firms by their predicted leverage targets. Since the
wealth transfer effect is predominant in the deleveraging process, a higher effect is expected
for firms with tendency to deleverage. I separate firms by their leverage targets, and find
that the fixed-price callable effect is stronger when firms are above their predicted leverage
targets.
One can argue that, since a call feature enables firms to retire the debt prior to the
maturity date, a firm with callable debt will automatically have a higher SOA than a firm
without callable debt (ceteris paribus). The effects could be induced by the presence of
call option, but not the call price itself, which runs counter to my hypothesis. In favor of
this argument, I observe that the presence of callable debt significantly affects its SOA with
respect to the long-term debt that is driving changes in the firm’s SOA toward its optimal
capital structure. I separately test the effects of callable debt on both short-term debt and
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long-term debt and find that the presence of callable debt not only increases the SOA with
respect to long-term debt, but also with respect to short-term debt. Since it is unlikely that
firms will exercise a call option in debt issues that are within one year of maturity, the results
suggest that it is the wealth transfer mechanism that drives changes in SOA.
To mitigate concerns regarding the underlying mechanism of fixed-call options, another
test is conducted as follows. In recent corporate debt financings, a new provision referred to
as a make-whole call provides us with an experiment. The make-whole call provision permits
firms to call back the debt at any time, but firms must redeem the debt at the market price.
In other words, the make-whole call provision on a corporate bond issue is a debt with call
option but not at a fixed call price. Moreover, make-whole call provisions are limited to
a specific time period after the bond is issued; the bond issue becomes callable at a fixed
price thereafter.4 If it is truly the presence of a call option that is driving the results, then
a higher SOA during the make-whole period is expected as well as during the fixed-price
call period. The results suggest the opposite. Firms do not exhibit higher SOA during their
make-whole period but do so during the fixed call price period. The results agree with the
hypothesis that it is the wealth transfer mechanism that drives firms’ SOA higher, not the
mere presence of a call option.
It is possible that the findings are driven by an endogenous choice - firms that deleverage
faster could also prefer to issue more callable debt. Although there are few studies in the
corporate finance literature that address this topic, it is possible that I overlooked factors
that could lead to this outcome.
To alleviate this concern of endogeneity, this chapter uses economic recession as an exogenous shock. The higher costs of deleveraging for firms with higher levels of long-term
debt imply that such firms should be much slower to deleverage in response to adverse shocks
to profitability, and hence should be riskier (Chaderina et al. (2018)). Since callable debt
4

For example, for a debt issue with 20 years to maturity, a make-whole provision may last for 10 years,
followed by a fixed price call option.
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reduces the cost of deleveraging, this effect should be significantly weaker for firms with
callable debt. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that during recessions the SOA is
slower for firms with more long-term debt, but significantly less so for firms with callable
bonds.
The analysis of SOA during recessions helps address another potential issue, namely that
firms that would like to maintain the capability to deleverage in the future might self-select
into issuing callable bonds. The economic distress brought on by a recession serves as a
plausible exogenous shock that creates an unanticipated incentive for firms to deleverage.
The finding that firms that have issued callable debt adjust more quickly during economic
downturns compared to firms without callable debt suggests that the presence of callable debt
does indeed reduce adjustment costs and mitigates firms’ concerns regarding the transfer of
wealth from shareholders to creditors.
Given the argument that issuing long-term debt impedes a firm’s ability to deleverage,
Chaderina et al. (2018) documented the presence of a maturity premium in expected stock
returns, i.e., those firms issuing relatively more long-term debt exhibit higher stock returns.
Given the evidence to support the hypothesis that callable bonds help to mitigate the effect
of long-term debt on deleveraging, I conjecture that the maturity premium should be lower
for firms that issue callable bonds. I find that, after controlling for other firm characteristics,
firms with callable debt exhibit lower expected equity returns.
This chapter contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, this chapter is
the first to document the effects of debt features on the dynamics of adjustments to capital
structure. I observe that bond provisions impact firms’ capital structure choices, both of
which are believed to be endogenously chosen. Second, this chapter sheds light on provisions
of corporate bonds, specifically fixed-price call options. I show that, while fixed-price call
options mitigate underinvestment problems, they also serve to reduce firms’ adjustment
costs, leading to higher SOAs with respect to capital structure. While leverage adjustment
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is an essential element in realizing the optimal value of a firm, callability plays a nontrivial
role in this process. This chapter shows empirical results from this perspective. Third, the
results offer additional evidence of the link between the SOA and the risks of a firm. While
Chaderina et al. (2018) document the maturity premium, I further study the way callable
debt helps to delever and lower a firm’s expected returns. This offers additional evidence of
the association between SOA and equity premium.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses previous literature on this topic. Section 3 presents the hypothesis development. Section 4 describes
the data sample and variables. Section 5 describes the primary empirical models. Section
6 examines the impact of debt maturity structure and the effect of callable bonds on SOA.
Section 7 analyzes the effects of fixed-price calls and make-whole provision on SOA. Section
8 examines variations in the effects of maturity structure, fixed-price calls and make-whole
provisions across the business cycle. Section 9 presents the impact of callable debt on equity
premiums. Section 10 presents the conclusions.

2.2.

Literature Review

This chapter is related to several strands of literature. The first strand is the literature
on capital structure. Within this strand the closest paper is by Flannery & Rangan (2006),
which is a follow-on study of the tradeoff theory first proposed by Modigliani & Miller (1963)
and Kraus (1973). The tradeoff theory states that since debt financing offers tax benefits to
firms and also involves bankruptcy costs, firms in equilibrium are expected to have optimal
debt ratios. Flannery & Rangan (2006) argue that in presence of adjustment costs, firms
do not constantly adjust to their optimal level of leverage. They conclude that on average,
firms move 30% of the way toward their target debt ratio per year. Hovakimian & Li
(2011) update the empirical model and conclude that the SOA is closer to 12% per year. By
adopting these previous theories and empirical models, this chapter examines how firms’ debt
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features impact the cost of adjustment, which leads to changes in firms’ SOA. Moreover, this
chapter adds to recent research on corporate deleveraging, following studies such as Denis &
McKeon (2012), DeAngelo et al. (2018), and Admati et al. (2018). the results suggest that,
within capital structure policies, deleveraging is substantially impacted by the choice of debt
features and bond provisions. Firms’ incentives to deleverage are impeded by the amount of
debt on their balance sheets.
The second strand is the literature that studies callable bonds. Callable bonds are considered to function as interest rate hedges, to reduce information asymmetries, and to moderate
underinvestment and risk shifting. The interest rate hedging function suggests that firms
issue bonds with fixed-price call provisions to mitigate the potential for future economic
conditions that result in lower interest rate. Firms with fixed-price call provisions in their
debt can call back that debt and replace it with issues paying lower rates of interest. It
has been documented that firms with higher exposure to interest rate risk favor callable
debt (Guntay et al. (2004); Mitchell (1991); Thatcher (1985)). Research on asymmetric
information and callable debt suggests that fixed-price calls can signal a firm’s true information to investors (Barnea et al. (1980)). In the field of agency problems, models show
that callable bonds with fixed call help limit the wealth transfer from shareholders to debt
holders. the chapter adheres closely to this second mechanism. Theoretical papers such
as Bodie & Taggart (1978), Barnea et al. (1980), and Robbins & Schatzberg (1986) form
hypotheses regarding the functions of fixed-price calls in light of the debt-overhang problem
proposed by Myers (1977). Other research on this topic includes Banko & Zhou (2010).
Another topic in the area of research on callable bonds is the complicated process of pricing
callable bonds and the optimal execution of call options. Jones et al. (1984) analyze callable
bonds pricing in the context of Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA) setting and find that
the value of callable debt is not a monotonic function of firm value. Jarrow & Turnbull
(1995) proposes a methodology to value options on corporate debt in response to credit risk.
Duffie & Singleton (1999) presents a reduced-form model to value contingent claims subject
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to default risk. Acharya & Carpenter (2002) model contingent claim pricing with stochastic
interest rate and they consider bankruptcy as an endogenous variable. Jarrow et al. (2010)
extend Duffie & Singleton (1999) model and simulate call option on corporate bonds using
an intensity process to characterize call probability. They find their model improves callable
bond pricing both in- and out-of-sample.

2.3.

Hypothesis Development

The first set of hypotheses is proposed based on the wealth transfer mechanism. Firms
incur value increase in their outstanding debt when they deleverage. Beneficiaries of such
value increase is mainly long-term debt holders. Thus, firms with more long-term debt
outstanding are less likely to adjust their leverage frequently, resulting in a slower SOA.
Therefore, I hypothesize that firms with relatively high levels of long-term debt on their
balance sheets will have slower SOAs.
Hypothesis 1.A. Ceteris paribus, firms with more long-term debt outstanding have a slower
SOA with respect to total leverage.
According to the conclusions in Barclay & Smith Jr (1995), firms target their debt maturity structures as well. Given a capital structure target and a debt maturity structure, firms
have both short-term and long-term leverage targets. Therefore, I propose the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1.B. Ceteris paribus, firms with relatively high amounts of long-term debt
outstanding have slower SOAs when adjusting toward their short-term and long-term leverage
targets.
Since the relative amount of long-term debt on the balance sheet is expected to affect a
firm’s SOA when a firm reduces its debt level, I hypothesize that long-term debt’s slowing
effect on the SOA appears predominantly in the deleveraging process
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This set of hypotheses closely follows Flannery & Rangan (2006) and Admati et al. (2018).
Flannery & Rangan (2006), “The speed with which firms reverse deviations from their target
debt ratio depends on the cost of adjusting leverage. . . In a frictionless world, firms would
always maintain their target leverage. However, adjustment costs may prevent immediate
adjustment to a firm’s target, as the firm trades off its adjustment costs against the costs
of operating with suboptimal leverage.” I hypothesize that, given the higher costs associated
with reducing long-term debt, firms will adjust toward their leverage target more slowly if
more long-term debt is present. With respect to deleveraging, Admati et al. (2018) concluded
that shareholders will be reluctant to reduce leverage even if doing so would increase firm
value. I propose another hypothesis on the SOA when firms deleverage:
Hypothesis 1.C. Ceteris paribus, firms with relatively high amounts of long-term debt
outstanding have slower SOA in their leverage adjustments, especially when they deleverage.
The second set of hypotheses builds on the fact that callable bonds where the call option
is at a fixed price have upside value for firms that wish to repurchase their outstanding debt.
The upside value is limited to fixed-price calls; it does not apply to make-whole calls. The
function of make-whole calls is to allow firms to call back the bonds at market value. These
benefits (mostly illiquidity costs) are not sufficient to induce a higher speed of adjustment,
which should result in insignificant coefficients in a regression model. Furthermore, since the
effect of a wealth transfer is at the firm level, I expect the change in the speed of adjustment
can be observed in total leverage, short-term leverage, and long-term leverage. Based on
these predictions, I propose the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2.A. Ceteris paribus, with callable bonds present, firms will have a higher SOA
with respect to total leverage, short-term and long-term leverage targets.
Hypothesis 2.B. Ceteris paribus, the effects on SOA given callable debt is stronger when
firms are above their leverage targets

47

Hypothesis 2.C. Ceteris paribus, the increase in SOA given callable debt only exists for
fixed-price calls, not make-whole calls.
It is possible that firms with more callable bonds adjust leverage more quickly do so
because they self-select into holding more callable bonds. Although this does not contradict
the premise I am establishing here, I test whether, in the face of unexpected leverage adjustment situations, callable debt enables firms to adjust leverage more quickly. When there
is a negative economic shock, firms have higher propensity to reduce their leverage. In this
situation, firms with callable bonds in their capital structure are less concerned with the
wealth transfer, thus adjust their leverage more quickly, lessening the effect of the economic
shock. Therefore, I propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3.A. When a negative exogenous economic shock (recession) is present, firms
with more long-term debt have slower SOA compared to non-recession years.
Hypothesis 3.B. When a negative exogenous economic shock (recession) is present, firms
with callable debt have a higher SOA compared to non-recession years.
Following Dangl & Zechner (2016), Admati et al. (2018), and Chaderina et al. (2018),
I hypothesize a callable debt effect on the equity risk premium. Previous research has
discussed the debt maturity premium, whereby the presence of long-term debt makes a firm
slower to adjust its leverage, inducing higher risk and a higher equity risk premium. With
callable debt mitigating the long-term debt effect on a firm’s SOA, firms with callable debt
should exhibit lower risks and thus lower expected returns. I therefore propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Firms with callable bonds exhibit a lower expected return on equity, controlling for other firm characteristics.
This hypothesis predicts that firms with callable debt outstanding should have lower
expected returns on equity, indicating a lower risk of bankruptcy.
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2.4.

Data and Sample Construction

the sample spans the period from January 1980 through December 2018. I use the
following primary sources of data. Firm annual characteristics are obtained from Compustat,
while stock price returns data are from CRSP. I use conventional variables and scaling as
in previous research on firm leverage.5 I exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) and
utility firms (SIC codes 4900 – 4999) from the analysis since their capital structure decisions
may exhibit special factors. I exclude firms with missing values for the variables I use. I
follow standard data editing protocols and trim the top and bottom 1% of the observations
to avoid extreme value effects.
I utilize two datasets for information on corporate bonds: the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) and the Securities Data Company (SDC). Combing the two datasets,
I identify characteristics of bond issuances for U.S. public firms. I use two sets of data from
Mergent FISD: bond issues and bond redemptions. I merge these two datasets using the
bond’s CUSIP identifier. I include “CDEB” (U.S. corporate debentures), “CCOV” (U.S.
corporate convertibles), “CMTN” (U.S. corporate medium term notes), and “CMTZ” (U.S.
Corporate zero coupon MTNs) in the analysis. The Mergent FISD dataset offers bond-level
terms and conditions including an issuing firm identifier, issue amount, issue date, maturity
date, bond provision flags (callable, convertible, etc.), bond action date (i.e., the date a
bond was called), action amount (i.e., the amount that was called), amount outstanding,
make-whole period, etc. I exclude all bonds for which any of the above characteristics are
missing.
Mergent FISD provides bond data from as early as 1960. However, the issuance coverage
is incomplete prior to 1980; thus, the final sample spans the period from 1980 to 2018. I
include each bond over its life span, from issuance to maturity (unless it is redeemed prior to
its maturity date) and accumulate bond issues at the firm level. If there is an action taken
5

See Rajan & Zingales (1995), Hovakimian et al. (2001), Flannery & Rangan (2006)
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that reduces the amount of a bond issue, I adjust the outstanding amount accordingly.
In the FISD dataset, I make a few changes on the bond characteristics based on the
judgments. For a small number of issues, I observed a recorded action as “E” (Entire Issue
Called), “P” (Part of an Issue Called), or “B” (Balance of Issue Called), but the provisions
for these bonds did not include a call feature (the callable indicator showed “not callable”).
I override the call feature indicator and mark these bonds as callable.6 I exclude callable
convertible bonds to improve the analysis, primarily because call options serve a different
purpose in convertible bonds. Firms include call options in convertible bond issues to restrict
investors’ behavior with respect to converting the bonds into shares of stock. The call option
could be used to force a conversion, if desired. Research such as Grundy and Verwijmeren
(2018) discuss this issue in detail. In addition, bonds that are both callable and convertible
are primarily viewed as convertible bonds (the call option is a secondary consideration).
Thus, I exclude these bonds from the analysis.
I combine bond issuance information from FISD with SDC bond issuance data. SDC
bond issuance data offers the period of call protection for fixed-price callable debt. In the
dataset, bond issues can have either a make-whole call or a fixed-price call, because the two
provisions are mutually exclusive. I merge the firm-level bond data with the Compustat
dataset of U.S. public firm accounting data. In total, I have a sample of 225,703 bonds, of
which 38% of are callable. After matching with the Compustat firm identifiers, I have a total
of 32,823 matches, within which 60% of the bonds are callable.
A summary of the statistics regarding bond characteristics and holdings is presented
in Table 2.1. I present the total (book) leverage, short-term leverage, long-term leverage,
size, annual return, tangibility, research and developments, market-to-book ratio, return on
assets, callable bond dummy and make-whole bond dummy.7 The leverage ratio is the sum
of short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is
6

I contacted the dataset administrators and they believe that these bonds should be callable, and the
indictor is an error. Excluding these bonds from the sample does not alter the results.
7
A complete list of variables used is shown in Appendix A
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short-term debt divided by assets. Long-term leverage is long-term debt divided by assets.
Size is the natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted sales. Return is the stock price return over
the fiscal year. Tangibility is the proportion of PPE to total assets. RD is the ratio of RD
expense to sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of assets over the book
value of assets. ROA is operating income over total assets. LTDM is an indicator set to one
for the top 50% of observations with non-zero long-term leverage and zero for the bottom
50% of observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for firms with callable debt and
zero for firms with no callable debt. All variables are two-sided trimmed at the 1% level.
I also present a subset of firms that include corporate bonds on their balance sheets for
counterfactual analysis.
I observe that firms that issue callable bonds have different characteristics compared to
firms that issue only non-callable bonds. Firms with fixed-price callable bonds in their debt
structure are larger (average logarithmic size of 7.02 compared to 5.21). The average book
leverage of firms that have issued callable bonds is 0.34, while the average book leverage
of firms without callable debt is 0.22. When I decompose book leverage into short-term
and long-term leverage ratios, I observe that firms with callable bonds favor long-term debt
financing. They have higher long-term leverage (0.29 comparing to 0.18), while short-term
leverage is similar between firms with and without callable bonds, at 0.04. The ratio of
tangible assets of firms that issued callable debt is 0.39 compared to 0.31 in firms without
callable debt. Across all firm-year observations, 12% of firms had fixed-price callable debt,
while across all firm-year observations firms that issue bonds the percentage is 60. There
is 6% of firms with make-whole callable bonds outstanding and the percentage is 30 within
firms that issue bonds. Other characteristics are similar between firms that issue callable
debt and those that do not. In total I have 22,983 firm-year observations for firms with
callable bonds out of the sample of 84,265 observations.
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2.5.

Empirical Models

the primary empirical model follows the partial-adjustment model presented in Flannery
& Rangan (2006). the primary measure of capital structure is book leverage, defined as

BLevi,t =

ST Di,t + LT Di,t
T otalAssetsi,t

(1)

where ST Di,t is the book value of short-term debt (defined as debt maturing within one
year) for firm i in year t. LT Di,t is the book value of long-term debt (defined as debt with a
remaining time to maturity greater than one year) for firm i in year t. T otalAsseti,t is the
book value of assets for firm i in year t. The partial-adjustment model is

∗
BLevi,t+1 − Blevi,t = λ(Blevi,t+1
− Blevi,t ) + δ̃i,t+1

(2)

∗
is the target leverage of firm i in year t. measures the expected percentage
where BLevi,t

reduction in the gap between target leverage and observed leverage for the firm; thus it is the
measure of SOA. is estimated as a number between 0 and 1. I predict the leverage target,
∗
BLevi,t
, as
∗
BLevi,t+1
= βXi,t + i,t

(3)

where Xi,t represents a matrix of firm characteristics. Substituting (3) into (2), I have

BLevi,t+1 = (1 − λBlev )Blevi,t + βXi,t + δ̃i,t+1

(4)

I estimate equation (4) to determine the average SOA for firms in the sample. The
difference between 1 and the estimated coefficient on BLevi,t is the SOA of the firms.
To test the effects of long-term debt, make-whole provisions, and fixed-price call provi-
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sions, I incorporate dummy variables into equation (4). The empirical model I test is

BLevi,t+1 = (1 − λBlev )Blevi,t + βD ∗ D ∗ Blevi,t + βXi,t + δ̃i,t+1

(5)

where the dummy D denotes dummy variables that represent long-term debt, and makewhole and fixed-price call features. I test whether βD is statistically significant and whether
the sign of βD matches the hypothesis.
Next, I decompose total firm leverage into short-term and long-term leverage:

BLevi,t = ST Levi,t + LT Levi,t

(6)

Based on findings in Barclay & Smith Jr (1995), firms have targets for their debt maturity
structures. Since maturity structure is considered a corporate decision, I should observe separate targets for short-term and long-term leverage. Thus, I run separate partial-adjustment
models for short-term and long-term leverage. In these specifications, the proportion of
short-term and long-term debt do not interfere with the coefficients; thus I can observe
accurate SOAs for short-term and long-term leverage.

ST
ST Levi,t+1 = (1 − λST lev )ST levi,t + βD
∗ D ∗ ST levi,t + βXi,t + δ̃i,t+1

(7)

LT
LT Levi,t+1 = (1 − λLT lev )LT levi,t + βD
∗ D ∗ LT levi,t + βXi,t + δ̃i,t+1

(8)

Here I estimate λST and λLT as the partial-adjustment speeds of short-term and longterm debt, respectively. Unlike equation (4), I do not require λST and λLT to be the same
magnitude. I test whether the speeds of adjustment of short-term and long-term debt are
ST
LT
different, and evaluate βD
and βD
according to the hypotheses.

The results are presented in Table 2.2. The first column presents the estimation results
from equation (4). The average adjustment speed across firms is approximately 12% per
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year. This SOA is consistent with findings in previous studies. Hovakimian & Li (2011)
criticize the empirical model used in Flannery & Rangan (2006) and document a similar
speed. DeAngelo et al. (2018) document an average of six years for firms to deleverage
and reach their target debt ratio. The leverage adjustment process, based on the empirical
analysis, is relatively long. At this rate, the marginal time required for firms to adjust toward
their leverage target is sensible. For example, a 20% increase in the SOA of firms (from 12%
per year to 14.4% per year) would reduce the time required for firms to adjust to their target
leverage by almost 1.5 years (1/12% = 8.3, 1/14.4% = 6.9). Since a firm’s value is tied to
its financial leverage, this amount of time is valuable. From another perspective, it would
increase a firm’s survival probability if a deleveraging requirement is looming.
When I decompose total book leverage into short-term and long-term leverage, I find
the two SOAs differ. In column (2) of Table 2.2, which presents the results from equation
(6), short-term debt has an average SOA of approximately 35%, and long-term debt has a
SOA of approximately 15%, as shown in the third column. When firms adjust toward their
leverage targets, the SOA for short-term leverage is faster than for long-term leverage. These
results reveal details about firms’ adjustment behavior. On average, firms adjust short-term
leverage twice as fast as long-term leverage. One reason is that maturities of short-term
debt are more imminent than for long-term debt; therefore, short-term debt can be reduced
simply by allowing a debt issue to mature without replacing it. Long-term debt is more
difficult to reduce due to the costs associated with repurchasing long-term debt issues in the
market. I separate the sample into firms without callable debt and firms with callable debt
and find similar patterns of SOAs using total book leverage, short-term leverage and longterm leverage. I confirm that on average, firms in the subsamples exhibit similar leverage
adjustment dynamics (Table 2.3).
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2.6.

Long-term Debt and Callable Effects on SOA

Following theoretical predictions in previous studies, in this section I test the effects of
long-term debt and callable debt on firms’ SOAs. I create the dummy variable LT DM that
takes a value of 1 if the firm is in the top 50% in terms of long-term leverage and 0 otherwise.
I set the dummy variable CallDM to have a value of 1 if the firm has callable debt in that
fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. I include the two dummies with total book leverage, short-term
leverage, and long-term leverage.
Table 2.4 presents the results for the whole sample. Firms that have a higher proportion
of long-term debt in their debt structure are slower to adjust their total leverage and shortterm leverage, but not their long-term leverage. The SOA for total book leverage decreases
from 17% to 12% for firms with higher than average long-term leverage, and the short-term
leverage SOA decreases from 35% to 25%. The decrease in long-term leverage SOA is not
statistically significant. I observe the following results for the subsample of firms that issue
callable bonds. The total book leverage SOA decreases from 27% to 10% for firms with
higher than average long-term leverage, and the short-term leverage SOA decreases from
52% to 32%. The long-term leverage SOA decreased from 34% to 16%. I observe a larger
change in SOA for firms that issue callable bonds compared to the total sample. The results
are consistent with hypothesis 1.A and 1.B.
The differences in the results for the total sample versus the subsamples are noteworthy
and shed light on how omitted variables affect the results. I expect firms that issue callable
bonds to have more severe debt-overhang problems since they show higher long-term leverage
in the summary statistics. The impact of long-term debt is greater for these firms compared
to firms without callable debt. Thus, although the effect of long-term debt does not show
up in the entire sample, the results in the subsample confirm the hypothesis that having a
higher level of long-term debt does impact SOAs for book leverage, short-term leverage, and
long-term leverage. I include the callable dummy variable with book leverage, short-term
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leverage, and long-term leverage in the regression results shown in Tables IV and V. Column
(1) in both tables presents the results on total book leverage.
Using the entire sample as shown in Table 2.4, the existence of callable debt produces
a 2% change in firms’ total SOA, compared to a 5% change for long-term debt. For shortterm debt the difference is 20%, while the impact of callable debt on long-term SOA is
not significant in the overall sample. In the subsample (Table 2.5, I observe effects more
consistent with the hypotheses. Callable debt leads to a 2.98% difference in SOA for total
leverage. The impact is higher for short-term leverage, with a difference of 9.47%, and the
impact for long-term leverage is 2.94%. The differences between the total sample and the
subsample indicate that unobserved variables have a nontrivial effect in the analysis. The
adjusted R2 indicates that I obtain better estimates of a firm’s long-term leverage targets
compared to short-term leverage targets.
The results in regressions (2) and (3) shown in Tables IV and V shed light on the mechanism of how fixed-price calls impact a firm’s SOA, as hypothsized by 2.A. Simply by showing
the effect on SOA for total book leverage one can argue that the effect is mechanical because firms can simply call bonds to adjust their leverage. In this view, firms with callable
debt adjust faster automatically, instead of through the mechanism of wealth transfer. the
regressions show that the effect is not only with respect to total book leverage and longterm leverage, but also impacts short-term leverage. The fact that the SOA for short-term
leverage is impacted by the presence of callable debt indicates that wealth transfer is the
mechanism, and is induced by callable debt, as callable debt is largely counted as long-term
debt. If the alternative argument were true, I would only observe a higher SOA for long-term
debt but not for short-term debt.
An additional test provide more evidences on the indicated effects. Since the fixedprice calls reduce the wealth transfer from shareholders to debtholders primarily when firms
deleverage, then I should observe higher effects when firms have higher propensity to reduce
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capital structure. I estimate the financial leverage target using a 5-year rolling overlapping
subsamples of data. Figure 2.4 illustrates the timing convention that I follow. For each
∗
, is obtained as an out-of-sample predicted value
firm-year, the target leverage ratio, Blevi,t

from the following estimation model, estimated over the previous 5 years, t - t − 58 :

Blevi,t =β0i + β1 × Sizei,t + β2 × T angibilityi,t + β3 × R&Di,t
(9)
+ β4 × R&DDMi,t + β5 × M Bi,t + i,t+1
This approach allows us to incorporate fixed firm effects that vary over time, which was
found to be important by DeAngelo and Roll (2015). Figure 2.4 illustrates this approach.
I separate the sample into above targets and below targets based on the observed leverage
ratio and predicted target ratio of teach firm, and I present the results in Table 2.6 and Table
2.7. As predicted, strong effects are observed on fixed-price callable debt in both the whole
sample and the subsample, adding evidences the the wealth transfer mechanism. This set
of results agrees with hypotheses that relate to firms’ adjustment speeds when deleveraging
(hypotheses 1.C and 2.B.

2.7.

Make Whole Provision on SOA

In recent years, a number of corporate bond issues have included a new provision referred
to as a make-whole call. This feature is gradually replacing fixed-price calls in corporate bond
issues. A make-whole call is an option that grants firms the right to call back the bonds, but
at the prevailing market price rather than at a fixed price. The make-whole call provides us
with an experiment to test whether it is the mere presence of a call option, or the fixed price
nature of the call feature that drives the results. I add M W DM , a dummy variable with a
∗
For each Blevi,t
, I require a minimum of two observations per firm during the applicable estimation
period.
8
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value of 1 when the bond is in its make-whole period, and 0 otherwise. I test to see whether
there are different sensitivities between fixed-price calls and make-whole calls and present
the results in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9. I observe that, unlike the fixed-price call dummy, the
make-whole dummy exhibits either insignificant or positive coefficients. Consistent with the
hypotheses, the call option itself does not benefit the leverage adjustment process (lowering
leverage adjustment costs). The fixed price nature of call options reduces wealth transfers
from shareholders to debt holders, acting as the underlying mechanism that drives the results.
The results agree with hypothesis 2.C.

2.8.

Economic Recession Test

One issue to consider is that firms might self-select by issuing more callable debt if they
have higher deleveraging requirements. One argument against this hypothesis is that issuing
callable debt requires firms to pay a premium to debt holder. This adds to firms’ cost of
capital, thus increasing adjustment costs. A firm with a high credit rating should instead
issue straight (non-callable) bonds. Moreover, this does not contradict the results presented
here, namely that having more callable debt increases firms’ deleverage speeds. To test the
alternative hypothesis, I use economic recession as an external shock to test unpredicted
leverage adjustments. When facing economic recession and worsening operating results,
firms want to reduce leverage at a time when deleveraging is becoming more difficult, as
firms need to preserve cash for operations. I separate the firm-year observations into two
subsamples. One includes firms’ operations in non-recession years, and the other includes
firms’ operations in recession years. The definition of being in an economic recession is that
within a firm’s fiscal year there is at least one month included in the NBER’s recorded dates
of economic recessions.
The results are presented in Table 2.10. I compare recession years against non-recession
years. Regressions (1), (3) and (5) are firm-year observations in non-economic recession pe58

riods, and (2), (4), and (6) are firm-year observations in periods of economic recession. First,
I observe slower SOAs in firms’ book leverage, short-term leverage, and long-term leverages
during recessions. The additional financing costs and worsening operations contributes to
slower SOA in firm leverage. This is consistent with hypothesis 3.A that in recession years,
firms adjust slower toward their leverage targets. The differences are tested for statistical
significance. A high level of long-term debt causes a larger slow down on firms’ SOA. Second, having issued with fixed-price calls in the debt structure, especially in recession years,
facilitates leverage adjustment behavior. I observe that having callable debt increases firms’
SOA significantly more in recession years compared to non-recession years. The fixed-price
call effects are significantly more negative (higher SOA) for total book leverage, short-term
leverage, and long-term leverage. On the other hand, the presence of make-whole calls does
not exhibit such patterns. The second set of observations offer strong evidence in favor of
hypothesis 3.B Overall, the results suggest that, facing unexpected economic distortions,
firms that are expected to deleverage experience difficulty doing so when they have more
long-term debt, while having fixed-price callable debt mitigates these effects.

2.9.

Callability and the Expected Returns of the Firms

As argued by Admati et al. (2018), and tested by Chaderina et al. (2018), firms with
relatively long-term maturity structures are riskier due to a lower propensity to deleverage
during periods of economic shocks. Their results suggest that firms with longer debt maturity
structures exhibit higher equity risk premiums. In the previous sections I have shown that
firms with more long-term debt outstanding exhibit slower SOAs. I further show that having
callable debt mitigates such effects for firms by limiting wealth transfers. Thus, I expect the
excess equity premium will be lower for firms with callable debt, ceteris paribus. In this
section, I test this hypothesis by examining the impact of debt features and callable debt on
expected returns on equity.
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I use a propensity score matching strategy to pair firms that have callable debt (treatment
firms) with firms that do not have callable debt (control firms) based on a comprehensive
set of firm characteristics. The propensity score is estimated from a logistic regression of
an indicator reflecting whether a firm has callable debt on the following covariates: market
value of equity, tangible assets scaled by total assets, RD expenses scaled by total assets,
market-to-book ratio, book leverage, long term debt scaled by assets, capital expenditures
scaled by total asset, profitability (return on assets) and credit rating. Each treatment firm
is then matched with a control firm with the closest propensity score. I then compute the
monthly expected returns differences between the treatment group and the control group,
adjusted for Fama & French (2015) risk factors. The monthly expected returns are calculated
following Fama & French (1993). The results are presented in Table 2.11, column (1). Firms
with fixed-price callable bonds exhibit lower equity premium after adjusting for risk factors.
Specifically, firms with fixed-price callable debt have an intercept (alpha) that is 55 bps
lower compared to firms without fixed-price callable debt. This finding is not sensitive
to the number of control firms assigned to the treatment firms, as column (2) reveals an
alpha of similar magnitude using a one-to-five matching strategy. Overall, the propensity
scores matching results substantiate my inference that firms with fixed-prices callable bonds
have a lower equity premium compared to firms without fixed-price callable bonds, which is
hypothesized in hypothesis 4.

2.10.

Conclusion

I studied the impact of debt maturity structure and callable bonds on firms’ ability
to adjust to their target capital structures. I find that long-term debt slows down the
speed of adjustment to target and, more specifically, reduces the likelihood of deleveraging
transactions. This finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction that deleveraging
leads to transfers of wealth from equity holders to debt holders, and that, such transfers are
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larger in the presence of substantial amounts of long-term debt.
I also find that callable bonds increase the speed of adjustments to target debt ratios
and increase the likelihood of deleveraging transactions. This finding is consistent with the
theoretical prediction that transfers of wealth from shareholders to debt holders as a result
of deleveraging are smaller in the presence of substantial amounts of callable bonds.
Consistent with a long-term debt/equity risk premium hypothesis, I find that firms with
relatively high levels of callable debt are associated with a lower equity risk premium, controlling for other variables.
This chapter suggests several areas for future research. There is scarce literature on
the connections between leverage and equity returns. the finds on callability and expected
return on equity sheds light on this puzzle. Another potential area of future research is
how to quantify the benefits of callable bonds on SOAs, and whether that benefit should be
factored into the price of callable bonds.
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Figure 2.1. Static Tradeoff Theory
This figure illustrates the static tradeoff theory. Firms balance benefits and costs of financial
leverage, and firms’ values are maximized at Lev ∗
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Figure 2.2. Tradeoff Theory with Adjustment Costs
This figure illustrates tradeoff theory with adjustment costs. Firms with higher adjustment
costs of leverage have wider target leverage zones (red) comparing to firms with lower adjustment costs (blue).
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Figure 2.3. Dynamic Tradeoff Theory
This figure illustrates tradeoff theory with adjustment costs. Firms with higher adjustment
costs of leverage have wider target leverage zones (red) comparing to firms with lower adjustment costs (blue). Firms with higher adjustment costs of leverage adjust less frequently
comparing to low adjustment costs.
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Figure 2.4. Leverage Target Prediction
The figure presents the timing convention for OLS regressions of leverage on a set of firm
characteristics, to estimate target leverage ratios. Time-varying target leverage ratios in
year (t) are calculated as the predicted values based on the parameter estimates obtained
from rolling fixed effects regression (1), estimated over the previous five years (t-1) through
(t-5). The sample firms are from Compustat. Leverage targets are estimated for years 1980
to 2018. The first estimation period starts in 1975.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
The sample firms are from Compustat and sample period spans from 1980 to 2018. Leverage ratio is the
sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is short-term
debt divided by assets. Long-term leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. Size is the natural logarithm
of CPI-adjusted sales. Return is the stock return over the fiscal year. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed
assets in total assets. RD is the ratio of RD expense over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market
value of assets over the book value of assets. ROA is operating income over assets. LT DM is an indicator
set to one for the top 50% of observations with positive long-term leverage and zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for firms with callable debt and zero for all other observations.
Panel A: Firm Characteristics (Full Sample)
N
Mean Median Std.
BLev
84,265
0.22
0.21
0.19
ST Lev
84,265
0.04
0.02
0.08
LT Lev
84,265
0.18
0.15
0.17
SZ
84,265
5.21
5.15
1.99
RET
84,265
0.17
0.08
0.73
TNG
84,265
0.31
0.24
0.24
R&D
84,265
0.05
0.00
0.14
MB
84,265
1.72
1.35
1.13
ROA
84,265
0.13
0.13
0.14
CallDM
84,265
0.12
0.00
0.33
M W DM 84,265
0.06
0.00
0.24
Panel B. Firm Characteristics (With Bonds)
N
Mean Median Std.
BLev
22,983
0.34
0.33
0.17
ST Lev
22,983
0.04
0.02
0.07
LT Lev
22,983
0.29
0.28
0.15
SZ
22,983
7.02
7.03
1.58
RET
22,983
0.15
0.11
0.57
TNG
22,983
0.39
0.34
0.26
RDS
22,983
0.03
0.00
0.09
MB
22,983
1.50
1.25
0.81
ROA
22,983
0.14
0.13
0.09
CallDM
22,983
0.60
1.00
0.49
M W DM 22,983
0.30
0.00
0.46
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Table 2.2: Adjustment to Leverage Target – Whole Sample
This table presents the results of regression of leverage on lagged values of the independent variables in the
whole Compustat sample from 1980 to 2018. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. ST leverage is short-term debt divided by assets. LT leverage is long-term
debt divided by assets. Industry average is the average level of leverage within industry defined by the first
two digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted sales. Return is the stock return over
the fiscal year. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed assets in total assets. RD is the ratio of RD expense over
sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets over the book value of assets. ROA is operating
income over assets. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level
clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
(1)
Blevi,t+1
Blevi,t

(2)
ST levi,t+1

0.8855***
(311.78)

ST levi,t

0.6580***
(58.06)

LT levi,t
IndustryAveraget
SZi,t
T N Gi,t
R&Di,t
M Bi,t
ROAi,t
RETi,t
Cluster
Obs
Adjusted R2
Year FE

(3)
LT levi,t+1

0.0527***
(8.13)
0.0017***
(9.54)
0.0152***
(8.60)
-0.0038
(-0.96)
0.0008**
(2.00)
-0.0144***
(-4.00)
-0.0025***
(-4.22)
Firm
84,265
0.79
Yes
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0.1686***
(7.80)
-0.0008***
(-4.94)
-0.0004
(-0.31)
-0.0206***
(-9.06)
-0.0005**
(-2.05)
-0.0305***
(-11.47)
-0.0015***
(-3.72)
Firm
84,265
0.45
Yes

0.8527***
(246.86)
0.0712***
(9.79)
0.0027***
(15.12)
0.0189***
(9.95)
0.0007
(0.18)
0.0005
(1.35)
-0.0095***
(-2.68)
-0.0012**
(-2.16)
Firm
84,265
0.75
Yes

Table 2.3: Adjustment to Leverage Target – Firms with Corporate Bonds
This table presents the results of regression of leverage on lagged values of the independent variables in
the Compustat sub-sample from 1980 to 2018 for firms with corporate bonds. Leverage ratio is the sum of
short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. ST leverage is short-term debt divided
by assets. LT leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. Industry average is the average level of leverage
within industry defined by the first two digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted
sales. Return is the stock return over the fiscal year. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed assets in total
assets. RD is the ratio of RD expense over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets
over the book value of assets. ROA is operating income over assets. The t-statistics reflect standard errors
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level,
two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
(1)
Blevi,t+1
Blevi,t

(2)
ST levi,t+1

0.8859***
(163.99)

ST levi,t

0.5282***
(20.64)

LT levi,t
IndustryAveraget
SZi,t
T N Gi,t
R&Di,t
M Bi,t
ROAi,t
RETi,t
Cluster
Obs
Adjusted R2
Year FE

(3)
LT levi,t+1

0.0426***
(3.68)
-0.0013***
(-3.15)
0.0086***
(2.97)
-0.0141
(-1.09)
-0.0043***
(-3.88)
0.0108
(1.10)
-0.0060***
(-5.07)
Firm
22.983
0.76
Yes
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0.2608***
(5.89)
-0.0013***
(-2.79)
-0.0044**
(-1.99)
-0.0140**
(-2.06)
0.0003
(0.37)
-0.0295***
(-4.14)
-0.0042***
(-4.38)
Firm
22.983
0.31
Yes

0.8196***
(118.82)
0.0623***
(4.49)
-0.0016***
(-3.45)
0.0125***
(3.56)
-0.0192
(-1.46)
-0.0035***
(-2.84)
0.0098
(0.89)
-0.0037**
(-2.44)
Firm
22.983
0.71
Yes

Table 2.4: Testing Long-term Debt and Callable Debt Effects on SOA - Whole Sample
This table presents the results of regression of leverage on lagged values of the independent variables in
the whole Compustat sample from 1980 to 2018. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and long-term
debt divided by the book value of assets. ST leverage is short-term debt divided by assets. LT leverage is
long-term debt divided by assets. LT DM is an indicator set to one for the top 50% of observations with
positive long-term leverage and zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for firms
with callable debt and zero for all other observations. Control variables include industry average leverage,
size, tangibility, RD, profitability, and equity returns. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**)
5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
(1)
Blevi,t+1
Blevi,t × LT DMi,t
Blevi,t × CallDMi,t
Blevi,t

(2)
ST levi,t+1

0.0522***
(6.82)
-0.0192***
(-2.69)
0.8340***
(133.12)

ST levi,t × LT DMi,t

0.1034***
(6.61)
-0.2013***
(-6.89)
0.6496***
(64.22)

ST levi,t × CallDMi,t
ST levi,t
LT levi,t × LT DMi,t
LT levi,t × CallDMi,t
LT levi,t
LT DMi,t
CallDMi,t
Controls
Cluster
Obs
Adjusted R2
Year FE

(3)
LT levi,t+1

-0.0034**
(-2.00)
0.0063***
(2.60)
Yes
Firm
84,265
0.76
Yes
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0.0117***
(14.72)
0.0059***
(4.58)
Yes
Firm
84,265
0.41
Yes

-0.0140
(-1.37)
-0.0061
(-0.65)
0.8398***
(96.53)
-0.0005
(-0.26)
0.0071**
(2.57)
Yes
Firm
84,265
0.71
Yes

Table 2.5: Testing Long-term Debt and Callable Debt Effects on SOA - Sub-Sample
This table presents the results of regression of leverage on lagged values of the independent variables
in the Compustat sub-sample from 1980 to 2018 for firms with corporate bonds. Leverage ratio is the
sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. ST leverage is short-term
debt divided by assets. LT leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. LT DM is an indicator
set to one for the top 50% of observations with positive long-term leverage and zero for all other
observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for firms with callable debt and zero for all other
observations. M W DM is an indicator set to one for firms with make-whole debt and zero for all other
observations. Control variables include industry average leverage, size, tangibility, RD, profitability,
and equity returns. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level
clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
(1)
Blevi,t+1
Blevi,t × LT DMi,t
Blevi,t × CallDMi,t
Blevi,t

(2)
ST levi,t+1

0.1766***
(5.64)
-0.0298***
(-3.34)
0.7264***
(23.15)

ST levi,t × LT DMi,t

0.2004***
(5.13)
-0.0947**
(-2.14)
0.4837***
(10.47)

ST levi,t × CallDMi,t
ST levi,t
LT levi,t × LT DMi,t
LT levi,t × CallDMi,t
LT levi,t
LT DMi,t
CallDMi,t
Controls
Cluster
Obs
Adjusted R2
Year FE

(3)
LT levi,t+1

-0.0216***
(-4.40)
0.0053*
(1.74)
Yes
Firm
22,983
0.75
Yes
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0.0009
(0.51)
0.0023
(0.51)
Yes
Firm
22,983
0.27
Yes

0.01852***
(5.05)
-0.0294**
(-2.48)
0.6609***
(17.82)
-0.0200***
(-4.24)
0.0060*
(1.73)
Yes
Firm
22,983
0.67
Yes
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Controls
Clusters
Obs.
Adjusted R2
Year FE

CallDM i,t

LTDM i,t

LTLev i,t ∗ CallDMi,t

LTLev i,t ∗ LTDMi,t

LTLev i,t

STLev i,t ∗ CallDMi,t

STLev i,t ∗ LTDMi,t

STLev i,t

Lev i,t ∗ CallDMi,t

Lev i,t ∗ LTDMi,t

Lev i,t

-0.0051**
(-2.19)
0.0105***
(2.78)
Yes
Firm
44,562
0.743
Yes

(1)
Above Target
Lev i,t+1
0.8144***
(94.87)
0.0710***
(6.97)
-0.0264***
(-2.62)

-0.0044*
(-1.95)
0.0022
(0.79)
Yes
Firm
39,703
0.731
Yes

(2)
Below Target
Lev i,t+1
0.8887***
(113.28)
0.0199*
(1.95)
-0.0103
(-1.08)

0.0125***
(10.75)
0.0064***
(4.00)
Yes
Firm
44,562
0.393
Yes

0.6105***
(51.47)
0.1097***
(6.21)
-0.2175***
(-7.14)

(3)
Above Target
Lev i,t+1

0.0075***
(8.41)
0.0040**
(2.46)
Yes
Firm
39,703
0.418
Yes

0.7526***
(52.26)
0.0831***
(3.46)
-0.1414***
(-3.02)

(4)
Below Target
Lev i,t+1

0.7850***
(56.48)
0.0310**
(2.02)
-0.0161
(-1.27)
-0.0076***
(-3.12)
0.0124***
(2.94)
Yes
Firm
44,562
0.680
Yes

(5)
Above Target
Lev i,t+1

0.8758***
(80.64)
0.0048
(0.35)
-0.0085
(-0.75)
-0.0066***
(-2.75)
0.0048*
(1.71)
Yes
Firm
39,703
0.705
Yes

(6)
Below Target
Lev i,t+1

This table presents the results of regression of leverage on lagged values of the independent variables in the whole Compustat sample from 1980 to 2018. A firm is defined
to be above leverage when the observed leverage ratio is greater than the predicted target leverage ratio, below otherwise. Leverage target using a 5-year rolling overlapping
subsamples of data. Column (1), (3), and (5) are partial adjustment regressions of firms above their predicted leverage targets. Column (2), (4), and (6) are partial adjustment
regressions of firms below their target leverage ratios. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. ST leverage is short-term
debt divided by assets. LT leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. LT DM is an indicator set to one for the top 50% of observations with positive long-term leverage and
zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for firms with callable debt and zero for all other observations. Control variables include industry average
leverage, size, tangibility, RD, profitability, and equity returns. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start (*)
indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.

Table 2.6: Leverage Targets - Whole Sample
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Controls
Clusters
Obs.
Adjusted R2
Year FE

CallDM i,t

LTDM i,t

LTLev i,t ∗ CallDMi,t

LTLev i,t ∗ LTDMi,t

LTLev i,t

LTLev i,t ∗ CallDMi,t

STLev i,t ∗ LTDMi,t

STLev i,t

Lev i,t ∗ CallDMi,t

Lev i,t ∗ LTDMi,t

Lev i,t

-0.0347***
(-4.01)
0.0120***
(2.61)
Yes
Firm
17,133
0.725
Yes

(1)
Above Target
Lev i,t+1
0.6758***
(14.44)
0.2276***
(4.87)
-0.0395***
(-3.25)

-0.0142***
(-2.89)
-0.0005
(-0.13)
Yes
Firm
9,938
0.751
Yes

(2)
Below Target
Lev i,t+1
0.8097***
(25.17)
0.1143***
(3.51)
-0.0240**
(-1.97)

-0.0032
(-1.04)
0.0039
(1.50)
Yes
Firm
17,133
0.254
Yes

0.4592***
(8.25)
0.2030***
(4.57)
-0.1259**
(-2.50)

(3)
Above Target
Lev i,t+1

0.0032
(1.55)
-0.0007
(-0.38)
Yes
Firm
9,938
0.342
Yes

0.5833***
(10.68)
0.2070***
(3.05)
-0.0449
(-0.88)

(4)
Below Target
Lev i,t+1

0.4132***
(5.40)
0.4252***
(5.61)
-0.0408**
(-2.54)
-0.0543***
(-5.48)
0.0118**
(2.29)
Yes
Firm
17,133
0.625
Yes

(5)
Above Target
Lev i,t+1

0.7404***
(20.61)
0.1440***
(3.97)
-0.0184
(-1.31)
-0.0180***
(-3.79)
0.0013
(0.35)
Yes
Firm
9,938
0.711
Yes

(6)
Below Target
Lev i,t+1

This table presents the results of regression of leverage on lagged values of the independent variables in the subsample of Compustat sample from 1980 to 2018. A firm is
defined to be above leverage when the observed leverage ratio is greater than the predicted target leverage ratio, below otherwise. Leverage target using a 5-year rolling
overlapping subsamples of data. Column (1), (3), and (5) are partial adjustment regressions of firms above their predicted leverage targets. Column (2), (4), and (6) are
partial adjustment regressions of firms below their target leverage ratios. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. ST
leverage is short-term debt divided by assets. LT leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. LT DM is an indicator set to one for the top 50% of observations with positive
long-term leverage and zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for firms with callable debt and zero for all other observations. Control variables
include industry average leverage, size, tangibility, RD, profitability, and equity returns. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level
clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.

Table 2.7: Leverage Targets - Subsample

Table 2.8: Testing Make-Whole Calls Effects on SOA - Whole Sample
This table presents the results of regression of leverage on lagged values of the independent variables in
the whole Compustat sample from 1980 to 2018. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and long-term
debt divided by the book value of assets. ST leverage is short-term debt divided by assets. LT leverage is
long-term debt divided by assets. LT DM is an indicator set to one for the top 50% of observations with
positive long-term leverage and zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for firms
with callable debt and zero for all other observations. M W DM is an indicator set to one for firms with
make-whole debt and zero for all other observations. Control variables include industry average leverage,
size, tangibility, RD, profitability, and equity returns. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**)
5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
(1)
Blevi,t+1
Blevi,t × LT DMi,t
Blevi,t × CallDMi,t
Blevi,t × M W DMi,t
Blevi,t

(2)
ST levi,t+1

0.0513***
(6.56)
-0.0203***
(-2.85)
-0.0002
(-0.06)
0.8328***
(132.50)

ST levi,t × LT DMi,t

0.1068***
(6.77)
-0.1995***
(-6.86)
-0.0706
(-1.41)
0.6503***
(64.25)

ST levi,t × CallDMi,t
ST levi,t × M W DMi,t
ST levi,t
LT levi,t × LT DMi,t
LT levi,t × CallDMi,t
LT levi,t × M W DMi,t
LT levi,t
LT DMi,t
CallDMi,t
M W DMi,t
Controls
Cluster
Obs
Adjusted R2
Year FE

(3)
LT levi,t+1

-0.0038**
(-2.19)
0.0069***
(2.86)
0.0000
(0.01)
Yes
Firm
84,265
0.76
Yes
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0.0117***
(14.56)
0.0051***
(4.00)
0.0008
(0.51)
Yes
Firm
84,265
0.41
Yes

-0.0185
(-1.54)
-0.0061
(-0.86)
0.0552***
(5.57)
0.8388***
(96.22)
-0.0005
(-0.29)
0.0086***
(3.11)
-0.0052*
(-1.86)
Yes
Firm
84,265
0.71
Yes

Table 2.9: Testing Make-Whole Calls Effects on SOA - SubSample
This table presents the results of regression of leverage on lagged values of the independent variables in
the whole Compustat sample from 1980 to 2018. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and long-term
debt divided by the book value of assets. ST leverage is short-term debt divided by assets. LT leverage is
long-term debt divided by assets. LT DM is an indicator set to one for the top 50% of observations with
positive long-term leverage and zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for firms
with callable debt and zero for all other observations. M W DM is an indicator set to one for firms with
make-whole debt and zero for all other observations. Control variables include industry average leverage,
size, tangibility, RD, profitability, and equity returns. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**)
5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
(1)
Blevi,t+1
Blevi,t × LT DMi,t
Blevi,t × CallDMi,t
Blevi,t × M W DMi,t
Blevi,t

(2)
ST levi,t+1

0.1743***
(5.56)
-0.0213**
(-2.15)
0.0232***
(2.33)
0.7174***
(22.64)

ST levi,t × LT DMi,t

0.2018***
(5.18)
-0.0945*
(-1.96)
-0.0126
(-0.22)
0.4838***
(9.69)

ST levi,t × CallDMi,t
ST levi,t × M W DMi,t
ST levi,t
LT levi,t × LT DMi,t
LT levi,t × CallDMi,t
LT levi,t × M W DMi,t
LT levi,t
LT DMi,t
CallDMi,t
M W DMi,t
Controls
Cluster
Obs
Adjusted R2
Year FE

(3)
LT levi,t+1

-0.0212***
(-4.31)
0.0029
(0.84)
-0.0055
(-1.59)
Yes
Firm
22,983
0.75
Yes
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0.0014
(0.81)
0.0006
(0.31)
-0.0069***
(-2.86)
Yes
Firm
22,983
0.27
Yes

-0.0185
(-1.54)
-0.0061
(-0.86)
0.0552***
(5.57)
0.8388***
(96.22)
-0.0194***
(-4.09)
0.0021
(0.55)
-0.0063
(-1.62)
Yes
Firm
22,983
0.67
Yes
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Controls
Clusters
Obs
Adjusted R2
Year FE

M W DMi,t

CallDMi,t

LT DMi,t

LT levi,t

LT levi,t × M W DMi,t

LT levi,t × CallDMi,t

LT levi,t × LT DMi,t

ST levi,t

ST levi,t × M W DMi,t

ST levi,t × CallDMi,t

ST levi,t × LT DMi,t

Blevi,t

Blevi,t × M W DMi,t

Blevi,t × CallDMi,t

Blevi,t × LT DMi,t

-0.0057***
(-2.71)
0.0021
(0.73)
-0.0005
(-0.18)
Yes
Firm
63,944
0.78
Yes

0.0623***
(5.43)
-0.0055
(-0.63)
0.0186**
(1.97)
0.8354***
(84.07)

(1)
Not in Recession
Blevi,t+1

-0.0180***
(-5.32)
0.0122**
(2.57)
0.0211***
(3.28)
Yes
Firm
20,231
0.81
Yes

0.1056***
(5.86)
-0.0333**
(-2.15)
-0.0242
(-1.09)
0.8123***
(54.96)

(2)
In Recession
Blevi,t+1

0.0071***
(7.72)
0.0023
(1.60)
0.0013
(0.71)
Yes
Firm
63,944
0.43
Yes

0.1166***
(5.16)
-0.1289***
(-3.34)
-0.0789
(-1.34)
0.6444***
(39.78)

(3)
Not in Recession
ST levi,t+1

0.0059***
(3.76)
0.0074***
(3.17)
0.0033
(1.46)
Yes
Firm
20,231
0.42
Yes

0.1521***
(4.25)
-0.2037***
(-3.90)
-0.1122*
(-1.86)
0.6020***
(25.42)

(4)
In Recession
ST levi,t+1

-0.0004
(-0.03)
0.0070
(0.70)
0.0362***
(3.40)
0.8650***
(74.82)
-0.0042**
(-2.03)
0.0015
(0.52)
-0.0026
(-0.86)
Yes
Firm
63,944
0.75
Yes

(5)
Not in Recession
LT levi,t+1

0.0598***
(3.09)
-0.0413**
(-2.18)
0.0113
(0.44)
0.8048***
(50.52)
-0.0120***
(-3.46)
0.0177***
(3.44)
0.0148**
(2.28)
Yes
Firm
20,231
0.77
Yes

(6)
In Recession
LT levi,t+1

This table presents the results of regression of leverage on lagged values of the independent variables in the whole Compustat sample from 1980 to 2018. A firm is defined to
be in recession when at least one month of the firm’s fiscal year overlaps with NBER defined economic recession periods. Column (1), (3), and (5) are partial adjustment
regressions of firms in non-recession years. Column (2), (4), and (6) are partial adjustment regressions of firms in recession years. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and
long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. ST leverage is short-term debt divided by assets. LT leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. LT DM is an indicator
set to one for the top 50% of observations with positive long-term leverage and zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for firms with callable debt
and zero for all other observations. M W DM is an indicator set to one for firms with make-whole debt and zero for all other observations. Control variables include industry
average leverage, size, tangibility, RD, profitability, and equity returns. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One
start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.

Table 2.10: Economic Recession Regressions

Table 2.11: Equity Premium by Propensity Score Matching
This table presents the results of monthly expected returns difference in firms with and without callable
debt using propensity score matching methodology based on the following firm characteristics: market value
of equity, tangibility, RD, market-to-book ratio, book leverage, long-term leverage, capital expenditures,
profitability, and credit rating dummy. The sample is from 1980 to 2018. The raw return difference is
adjusted by Fama-French five factors (Market, Size, B/M, profitability and Investment). The table presents
both one-to-one and one-to-five matching results. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars
(**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.

Match Criteria
Intercept
βM KT
βSM B
βHM L
βCM A
βRM W

(1)
One to One
-0.0055***
(-14.87)
0.197***
(3.91)
0.012
(0.15)
0.217**
(2.35)
-0.138
(-1.03)
0.133
(1.42)
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(2)
One to Five
-0.0050***
(-7.41)
0.121***
(3.52)
0.019
(0.39)
0.164***
(2.60)
0.035
(0.38)
0.079
(1.22)

Chapter 3
Cash Policies, Capital Structure, and Corporate Debt
Features

3.1.

Introduction

This chapter studies the interplay between a firm’s capital structure and its cash holdings. A number of previous empirical studies of firms’ cash-holding policies find a strong
negative correlation between firms’ cash holdings and their financial leverage, while the interpretations of such relationship vary. John (1993) implied that borrowing can serve as
a substitute of cash financing so that leverage, as a proxy for a firm’s ability to borrow,
exhibits a negative relationship with cash holdings. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson
(1999) interpreted the relationship between cash and leverage as managers largely prefer
keeping cash over borrowing, which agrees mostly with the pecking order theory. Majority
of managers surveyed by Graham & Harvey (2001) agree to the fact that they intend to keep
financial flexibility of a firm by keeping cash reserves high and leverage low. DeAngelo et al.
(2018) echoed this finding that firms restore cash holdings as they deleverage to keep financial flexibility. Such behavior of managers can also be explained by managerial discretion
proposed by Jensen & Meckling (1979) that managers tend to satisfy individual incentives,
or they are more risk averse. Graham & Leary (2018) suggested that the negative relationship is due to lower precautionary motives to hold cash when firms have access to short-term
and long-term debt market. Puzzled by the diverse explanations, I add to this literature by
empirically testing multiple theoretically grounded channels that could drive the observed
negative cash–leverage relationship and the validity of the implications of different theories.
The hypotheses about the determinants of cash holdings are closely tied to the theories
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of corporate financing. Studies as early as Keynes (1936) demonstrated that, with ample
liquidity, firms could undertake forthcoming value increasing projects in a timely manner.
The pecking order theory (Myers (1984)) posits that firms maximize shareholder wealth
by financing projects first with internally generated cash, then with debt, and finally with
external equity financing, based on the cost hierarchy of the financing methods. Since cash
holdings are the cheapest form of financing and debt is the next cheapest, they can be
viewed as substitutes. Hence, firms that follow this pecking order of financing and are able
to generate and accumulate cash will naturally borrow less.
The trade-off theory offers an alternative description that firms choose the amount of
cash they want to hold by balancing the benefits and costs of holding cash. The benefits
of holding cash include lower transaction costs, precautionary motives, and the need to
maintain financial flexibility in the face of financial constraints (Opler et al. (1999); Graham
& Harvey (2001); Hovakimian & Titman (2003); Bates, Kahle & Stulz (2009); Bakke &
Gu (2017)). Transaction benefits arise from holding cash because firms can avoid incurring
transaction costs of external funding and liquidating assets to make payments. Firms also
hold cash out of precautionary motives to safeguard against sudden needs for liquidity, e.g.,
in economic downturns when firms face increased financial distress risks. The benefits of
holding cash are also higher for firms facing hurdles in their access to financial markets and
those facing substantially higher costs of external financing.
These benefits of cash are likely to increase with leverage since the transaction costs
associated with borrowing, the potential for financial distress, and the cost of borrowing are
all likely increase with leverage. However, high leverage could proxy for better access to
debt markets and higher debt capacity, since the prior literature documents that firms with
higher target debt ratios and firms with access to public debt markets tend to have higher
observed debt ratios (Hovakimian et al. (2001); Faulkender & Petersen (2006)). Thus, a
negative relation between debt and cash could really reflect the negative relation between
debt capacity and cash holdings.
78

The costs of holding cash include opportunity costs and agency costs. Returns on cash
are substantially lower than returns generated by productive assets. Shareholder wealth
could be increased by distributing excess cash to shareholders who could then redirect the
funds for more productive use. The opportunity costs are likely to increase with financial
leverage as the interest paid on high risk debt is likely to substantially exceed the returns
earned on cash holdings.
Additionally, managers have incentives to pursue their personal interests (e.g., consuming
perquisites, pursuing pet projects, etc.) and excessive cash levels along with low leverage may
allow them to diverge from maximizing shareholder wealth (Jensen & Meckling (1979); Azar,
Kagy & Schmalz (2014); Nikolov & Whited (2014); Boileau & Moyen (2016)). Conversely,
such agency costs of managerial discretion can be reduced by means of high leverage which
will force managers to pay out cash and reduce cash balances. Finally, cash is a safe asset
that reduces the risk of outstanding debt and as such is associated with wealth transfers
from shareholders to creditors. As a result, highly levered firms may suffer from the problem
known as debt overhang (Myers (1977)) and be reluctant to invest in safe assets, including
cash. To understand the channel generating the negative relation between leverage and cash
holdings, I conduct a number of tests.
First, I note that thirteen percent of observations in my sample have zero leverage and,
hence, the negative cash-leverage relationship could be driven by these observations. Indeed,
studies by Strebulaev & Yang (2013) and Dang (2013) have documented that zero-leverage
firms hold substantially higher levels of cash than their comparable firms with positive leverages. To control for the effects of zero-leverage firms, I include a zero-leverage indicator
variable in all my regressions. The results show that zero leverage firms indeed hold more
cash but that the negative relation between leverage and cash remains economically meaningful and statistically significant. The negative relation between leverage and cash could
be driven by low leverage firms holding a lot of cash or by highly leveraged firms holding
too little cash. The high cash holdings of zero leverage firm are not consistent with the
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hypotheses emphasizing the latter scenario, such as the agency theory based arguments that
high leverage reduces free cash flow or that it leads to debt overhang. The finding is consistent with theories that imply that cash is preferred to debt as a form of financing due to
managerial preferences, agency costs of managerial discretion, or adverse selection costs.
Next, I reestimate the cash holdings regression after decomposing the total leverage
into short-term and long-term leverage components. Short-term borrowings, e.g., from the
commercial paper market, are the closest substitute to cash and if the negative relation
between leverage and cash is driven by the desire to maintain short-term liquidity, then
the relation should hold for short-term debt but not long-term debt. Consistent with this
hypothesis I find that the negative sensitivity is significantly stronger for short-term leverage.
However, the sensitivity of cash to long-term leverage is also significantly negative, suggesting
that factors other than short-term liquidity are also likely to be important.
As discussed earlier, the negative relation between leverage and cash can arise if firms
with better access to debt markets benefit less from holding cash and also choose to have
higher leverage. I test this hypothesis by examining the cash-leverage sensitivity across
subsamples with and without credit ratings, as well as subsamples with investment grade
vs. speculative grade ratings. The results are consistent with this hypothesis. First, all
rated firms tend to hold significantly less cash than unrated firms. Furthermore, firms with
speculative grade ratings hold significantly more cash than investment grade firms, likely
because the benefits of access to public debt markets are lower for speculative grade firms
that have used up most of their additional debt capacity. Finally, both investment grade
and speculative grade firms show lower sensitivity of cash to leverage as the variation in debt
capacity within each group is likely much smaller than within the unrated subsample. All of
these results hold for total debt ratios as well as for short-term and long-term debt ratios.
The sensitivity of cash to leverage is particularly low for speculative grade firms, which could
indicate that all such firms face short-term liquidity issues and, hence, show little variation
in cash holdings regardless of their leverage ratios.
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I then examine the variation in the sensitivity of cash to leverage based on the degree of financial constraints. Firms that are not financially constrained, i.e., have access
to inexpensive external financing, do not need to maintain financial flexibility by means of
high cash balances. Studies of the effects of financial constraints (e.g., Chen, Harford &
Lin (2017); Acharya, Almeida & Campello (2007); Hovakimian & Titman (2003); Fazzari,
Hubbard & Petersen (1988)) show that firms retain high cash reserves and low leverage to
preserve financial flexibility. In Graham & Harvey (2001) survey study, managers admit
that they strategically keep more cash and low leverage for financial flexibility reasons. This
motivation should be stronger for financially constrained firms. Alternatively, despite their
stronger motivation to accumulate cash and maintain low leverage, financially constrained
firms may be unable to achieve that due to low level of generated cash flows and high financing needs. Indicators of financing constraints can also help identify firms where managers
are constrained to pursue their personal objectives and, hence, where the agency costs of
managerial discretion are low.
I find that firms that are more constrained hold less cash and exhibit lower, but still
significantly negative, sensitivity of cash to leverage. These results hold for total leverage, as
well as for short-term leverage and long-term leverage. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that the negative sensitivity of cash to leverage is primarily driven by firms that
have the flexibility to choose both low leverage and high cash, either to maintain strategic
financial flexibility in the interest of shareholders or in their own interest.
Next, I test for differences in the sensitivity of cash to leverage between firms that are
below their target debt ratios, i.e., are underlevered, and those that are above their target
debt ratios, i.e., are overlevered. I find that underlevered firms hold more cash and show
significantly more negative sensitivity of cash to leverage. These results are inconsistent with
the hypotheses that imply that the sensitivity is primarily driven by excessively high leverage
draining firms’ cash. The results are more consistent with hypotheses that the sensitivity is
driven by firms that are able to choose both low leverage and high cash, either to maintain
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strategic financial flexibility in the interest of shareholders or in their own interest.
I next test an important implication from the agency theory of Myers (1977) that firms
having higher debt levels outstanding may avoid safe projects, even when they are valueincreasing, because the primary beneficiaries of such investments are the firm’s debtholders.
This effect also implies that firms having higher leverage intend to hold less cash. As firms
accumulate cash, they become less prone to financial distress. Thus, the value of the firm’s
outstanding debt increases with accumulation of cash, leading to a wealth transfer from
shareholders to debtholders. Managers acting in the interests of their shareholders should,
therefore, have less incentive to hold cash when outstanding debt and the potential for wealth
transfer are high. This debt overhang problem could potentially be one of the reasons for
the observed negative relation between leverage and cash.
I use the presence of fixed-price callable debt in corporate capital structures to test this
hypothesis. Bodie & Taggart (1978) and Barnea et al. (1980)) theorize that the presence
of fixed-price callable debt mitigates the debt overhang, or the underinvestment, problem.
Call provisions with fixed call prices effectively limit the value increases on the outstanding
debt and, hence, reduce the potential for wealth transfers. As such, firms with fixed-price
callable debt should be more willing to invest in safe assets such as cash when their leverage
is high. This means that firms with callable debt should have lower absolute sensitivity of
cash to leverage. Since long-term debtholders are the primary beneficiaries of such wealth
transfers, the effects of fixed-price callable debt should be stronger for long-term leverage.
I find that, everything else remaining constant, firms holding callable debt exhibit lower
absolute sensitivity of cash to leverage. The effect of callable debt, on average, reduces the
magnitude of the sensitivity by about 40%. Consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis,
this effect is driven by long-term debt. Short-term debt sensitivity to cash does not vary
significantly between firms with and without fixed-price callable debt. This result indicates
that the agency cost of debt is an important factor generating the negative sensitivity of
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cash to leverage.
The result on fixed-price callable debt is challenged by two alternative hypotheses about
how call options may affect the sensitivity of cash to leverage. First, call options reduce the
duration of corporate debt. As a result, firms with callable debt could hold more cash to be
able to pay off their debt earlier. Second, papers by Brown & Powers (2012) and Powers &
Tsyplakov (2008) suggest that call options on bonds improve the firm’s financial flexibility.
Since neither of these hypotheses requires the call option to feature a fixed price feature, I
can test if make-whole call provisions reduce the sensitivity of cash to leverage, similar to
fixed-price call provisions.
A make-whole provision on corporate debt is a call option but without a fixed price.
Bonds with make-whole provisions can be called back by the issuing firms. However, the
repurchase price is determined by the market interest rate. Since the market interest rate
fully reflects the riskiness of the bond, make-whole callable debt does not limit the potential
wealth transfer from shareholders to debtholders. Hence, this distinction between makewhole and fixed-price call provisions offers an opportunity to identify whether the effect
is driven by the presence of a call option in general or specifically its fixed-price call feature. I find no significant effects on the sensitivity of cash to leverage from the make-whole
provisions. Furthermore, the effect of fixed-price call provisions remains unchanged in the
presence of make-whole control variable in the regressions.
As an additional sensitivity check, I use economic recessions as exogenous shocks to
the test how cash–leverage sensitivities and the wealth-transfer mechanisms impact firms’
leverage and profitability. Cash holdings and capital structure are both endogenously chosen
by corporate managers based on their firms’ characteristics. By focusing on an exogenous
shock, one can plausibly hold those various characteristics constant, testing whether the
sensitivity of cash to leverage remains stable and the previous findings continue to hold.
The shock-test results corroborate my inferences. I find that, during economic recession
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periods, the sensitivity of cash to leverage is not significantly different from that during nonrecession periods, especially for long-term leverage. I also observe that the effect of access
to public debt markets on cash–leverage sensitivity weakens during economic recessions,
whereas the impact of fixed-price callable debt is stronger during recessions.
Finally, I examine the effect of leverage on changes in cash holdings while additionally
controlling for lagged cash holdings and find that leverage reduces future cash holdings, likely
due to debt service payments. Regressing the differences in cash-holding levels on leverages
to test magnitudes of the effects, I observe a significant but relatively low effect that cannot
contribute to the total effects on cash–leverage sensitivities.
To summarize, this chapter documents and studies the negative effect of leverage on corporate cash holdings. This effect is observed for both sort- and long-term leverage, for firms
with and without access to public debt markets, financially constrained and unconstrained
firms, firms that are overlevered and those that are underlevered, and firms with and without
callable debt. The relation between leverage and cash remains statistically and economically
significant in both recession and non-recession periods. The comparison of the relative magnitudes of the relation between leverage and cash across subsamples of firms and across the
business cycle suggests that several mechanisms are at play. That said, I find the strongest
support for the hypotheses based on access to easy credit and debt overhang.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses previous literature. Section
3 presents hypothesis development. Section 4 describes the data, variables, and empirical
model. Section 5 presents the results of testing cash-leverage sensitivities across firms with
different leverage levels and different types of debt. Section 6 test cash leverage sensitivities
with access to better credit market. Section 7 analyzes the effects on financial flexibility
and managerial motive. Section 8 tests the wealth-transfer mechanism. Section 9 tests the
impact of capital structure on cash restoration. Section 10 summarizes my conclusions.
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3.2.

Literature Review

This chapter is motivated by four strands of literature. The first strand studies cash holding levels, starting with Keynes (1936) who described the benefits of holding cash, namely,
transaction cost avoidance and precautionary motive assumption for future investments.
Cash holding costs include brokerage costs and insufficient investment. Miller & Orr (1966)
are the first few to propose an organizational model of cash holding to mitigate transfer costs.
Jensen & Meckling (1979) documented how excessive cash holdings may lead to agency costs
of managerial discretion. Myers (1984) discussed the cash holding policy in the context of
asymmetric information. Opler et al. (1999) analyzed cash holding target, considering the
costs and benefits of holding cash. Faulkender & Petersen (2006) noted that the variations
in the marginal value of cash are attributable to leverage and relative tax effects of payout
decisions. Denis & Sibilkov (2010) reported that financially constrained firms have higher
cash value than unconstrained firms. Recent financial studies have focused on increasing
firms’ cash holdings. Graham & Leary (2018) examined the time-series trend of corporate
cash holding progress and conclude that firms in the time series hold more cash but the incremental effect comes from new public entrants. Moreover, DeAngelo et al. (2018) observed
that firms tend to restore their financial flexibility and increase their cash holdings when
they deleverage. Gu (2017) and Bakke & Gu (2017) focused on cash holding discretion of
multinational and diversified firms. Boileau & Moyen (2016) and Azar et al. (2014) argued
that cash holding costs had decreased. Other financial research focus on various mechanisms
that affect cash holdings. Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) found decreased cash value when
firms have poor corporate governance. Harford, Mansi & Maxwell (2008) concluded that
firms with weak governance level have lower cash reserves. Bates et al. (2009) show that
cash flows generated by corporate operations increased volatility.
The second strand of literature studies cash flow sensitivities to financial constraints.
Fazzari et al. (1988) implied that financial constraints impact firms’ investments. In addi-
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tion, Kashyap, Lamont & Stein (1994) documented that financial constraints affect firms’
cash flows and current assets, such as inventory. Calomiris, Himmelberg & Wachtel (1995)
concluded that firms with commercial paper access exhibit low cash flow sensitivity when
facing financial constraints. Kaplan & Zingales (1997) proposed a financial constraint measure (i.e., the KZ index) that is a fundamental constraint used in empirical finance studies.
Almeida & Campello (2007) found that firms’ investment cash flow sensitivity increases when
firms are financially constrained. Li et al. (2018) examined cash investment sensitivity under
endogenous financial constraints in the moral hazard framework.
The third strand of literature studies cash value with external borrowing. Chen, Harford
& Lin (2015) studied the effect of analyst coverage on cash holding value. Moreover, Bates,
Chang & Chi (2018) studied the times series value increase of cash holdings. The literature
has also documented that cash value varies according to the degree of agency conflicts.
Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) showed that cash value increases along with shareholder
right index and is higher for firms with significant outside blockholders. Liu & Mauer (2011)
identified a negative relationship between chief executive risk-taking incentives and cash
value, attributing the relationship to stockholder–bondholder conflicts.
The fourth strand of literature focuses on callable bonds, particularly on how fixed-price
callable debt mitigates underinvestment problems. Mauer (1993) presented that bond options (such as call and convertible) could be used to mitigate agency problems of firms
that issue risky debt. According to Bodie & Taggart (1978), call provisions on long-term
bonds strengthen firms’ incentives to invest in that firms can renegotiate the bond terms
and associated growth opportunities are appealing to shareholders using the call provision.
Barnea et al. (1980) presented a theoretical model in which call provisions and debt maturity
structures could solve agency problems associated with information asymmetry, managerial
risk incentives, and forgone growth opportunities. Banko & Zhou (2010) found that callable
bonds were issued by firms with information asymmetry and underinvestment problems. Additionally, callable bonds could signal a firm’s better prospects in the presence of asymmetric
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information. Robbins & Schatzberg (1986) showed that short-term and callable bonds could
signal better prospects for a firm. However, short-term bonds weaken risk-sharing with
capital markets.

3.3.
3.3.1.

Hypothesis Development
Transaction Cost and Precautionary Motive

Keynes (1936) and Opler et al. (1999) concluded that the primary cash holding benefits
come from reduced transaction costs and managerial precautionary motives. Firms with
sufficient cash holdings can avoid excessive transaction and liquidation costs when raising
external funds and making repayments. Firms also exhibit precautionary behavior by holding
cash to safeguard against various (known and unknown) risks, such as bankruptcy and
macroeconomics risks. These cash holding benefits are likely to increase with leverage due
to heightened transaction costs and bankruptcy risks induced by high leverage. Thus, firms
likely preserve high cash holdings and low leverage levels, leading to negative cash–leverage
sensitivity. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 5.A. Due to transaction and precautionary benefits, firms preserve high cash
holdings and low leverage levels, leading to negative cash–leverage relationship.
If firms can easily and quickly raise external funds, then their transaction costs and
precautionary motives for holding cash weaken (John (1993)). Furthermore, short-term
debt markets (lines of credits, commercial papers, etc.) can satisfy firms’ liquidity needs
better than long-term debt markets (bank loans and corporate bonds). Kahl et al. (2015)
and Kacperczyk & Schnabl (2010) showed that commercial papers are crucial to providing
short-term financing for US public firms. A robust literature, including Jeanne & Korinek
(2019), Acharya et al. (2019), and Caballero et al. (2020), provides evidence that short-term
liquidity vehicles, such as line of credit, have become an increasingly important financing tool
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after the 2008 financial crisis. Such benefits are substantial when firms stay at low leverage
levels but less when they increase leverage. Thus, the following hypothesis regarding cash
levels and cash–leverage sensitivities is proposed:
Hypothesis 5.B. Ceteris paribus, firms exhibit stronger cash–leverage sensitivity for shortterm leverage than for long-term leverage.

3.3.2.

Debt Market Access

As previously argued, firms with better access to debt markets benefit less from cash
holding because they can immediately issue debt while incurring relatively less cost. This
condition suggests that these firms tend to hold less cash to control other cash holding
determinants. Furthermore, Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Faulkender & Petersen (2006)
observed that firms with better access to markets tend to have high debt ratios. Low cash
holding and high debt ratio can contribute to negative cash–leverage relationship. Moreover,
firms with better debt market access (i.e., credit-rated firms) have less variation in their
ability to borrow compared to firms without debt market access (i.e., firms not credit-rated).
This condition leads to low cash–leverage sensitivity among credit-rated firms. Thus, the
following hypotheses based on the implications are proposed.
Hypothesis 6.A. Ceteris paribus, firms with better access to debt market hold less cash.
Hypothesis 6.B. Ceteris paribus, Ceteris paribus, firms with better access to debt market
exhibit lower cash-leverage sensitivities.

3.3.3.

Financial Flexibility

Managers may strategically remain financially flexible by maintaining high cash levels
and low leverage ratios, contributing to negative cash–leverage sensitivity. Studies, such as
Lemmon & Zender (2010) and Acharya et al. (2007), have demonstrated that firms are likely
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to maintain low leverage to have adequate debt capacity while facing financing choices. Graham & Harvey (2001) surveyed managers and reported that they remained financially flexible
by maintaining high cash levels and low debt levels to satisfy future investment requirements.
Such behavior can either maximize shareholder wealth or be driven by managerial discretion
(Jensen & Meckling (1979)). The high cash holding at low leverage levels induces a negative
cash–leverage relationship, particularly with low leverage levels. Therefore, the following
hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 7.A. Ceteris paribus, firms remain financial flexibility by holding more cash
and keeping low leverage, leading to a negative cash-leverage sensitivity.
Alternatively, negative cash–leverage sensitivity is argued from high interest payments
due to firms’ high leverage levels, leading to less cash accumulation. Thus, highly leveraged
firms drive cash–leverage sensitivity rather than less leveraged firms. Therefore, the following
alternative hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 7.B. Ceteris paribus, firms make larger interest payments at higher leverage
levels, leading to a negative cash-leverage sensitivity.
Hovakimian & Titman (2003) and Fazzari et al. (1988) found that financial constrained
firms are likely to hold cash. In addition, Chen & Lai (2012) found that financially constrained firms engage in tax avoidance activities and rely on cash financing. However, financially constrained firms may not hold high cash levels due to high financing needs and limited
cash flows. Thus, whether highly leveraged firms also have high cash holding is theoretically
ambiguous. Thus, the following null hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 7.C. Ceteris paribus, highly financially constrained firms have higher cash holding level compared with less financially constrained firms.
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3.3.4.

Wealth Transfer

Wealth transfer mechanism could drive negative cash–leverage sensitivity. As cash level
increases, firms become less sensitive to internal and external risks, thus improving credit
ratings. Such mechanism will increase outstanding debt value, leading to wealth transfer
from shareholders. Myers (1977) documented that agency costs associated with outstanding
debt induce managers to hold less cash. To test this mechanism, this chapter draws on the
theoretical predictions by Bodie & Taggart (1978) and Barnea et al. (1980) that fixed-price
callable debt can reduce wealth transfer by limiting the increase in outstanding debt. Thus,
firms with callable debts tend to have high cash holding due to limited wealth transfers from
shareholders to debtholders. The following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 8.A. Ceteris paribus, firms exhibit lower cash–leverage sensitivities when holding fixed-price callable debt.
Wealth transfer mechanism is predicted to be stronger for long-term debt because longterm debtholders are the primary beneficiaries of such transfer. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 8.B. Ceteris paribus, firms exhibit lower cash–leverage sensitivities for longterm debt when holding fixed-price callable debt. There is no impact on the sensitivity between
cash and short-term leverage.

3.4.
3.4.1.

Data and Empirical Model
Sample Construction

The empirical sample spans the period from January 1980 to December 2018 from three
primary data sources. The first source is Compustat, which provides firms’ accounting
characteristics. Conventional variables and scaling from previous leverage research are used
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(Rajan & Zingales (1995), Hovakimian et al. (2001), Flannery & Rangan (2006)). Financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) and utility firms (SIC codes 4900–4999) are excluded from
analysis. Standard data editing procedures are followed, and the top and bottom 1% are
eliminated to avoid extreme value effects. All observations with missing values in the variables demonstrated below are excluded.
The second and third data sources are the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database
(FISD) and Securities Data Company (SDC), respectively, which provide corporate bond
information. Comprehensive characteristics of bond issuances within US public firms were
obtained by combing these two data sources. Two datasets from the Mergent FISD were used,
namely, bond issues and bond redemption. These datasets are merged using the Committee
on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures identifier. US corporate debentures (CDEB),
US corporate convertibles (CCOV), US corporate medium term notes (CMTN), and US
corporate zero-coupon MTNs (CMTZ) were included in the analysis. The Mergent FISD
dataset offers bond-level data attributes, including issue firm identifier, issue amount, issue
date, maturity, bond provision flags (callable, convertible, etc.), bond action date (the date
a bond is called), action amount (the amount called), amount of bond outstanding, and
make-whole period among others. All bonds without the above characteristics are excluded.
Mergent FISD provides bond data from 1960. However, the issuance coverage is incomplete
before 1980. Thus, all such observations are excluded. Thus, the final sample is from 1980 to
2018. Each bond is expanded over its life span from issuance to maturity (unless redeemed)
and accumulates the outstanding amount at the firm level. If an action is taken on the bond,
then its existence is adjusted accordingly. In the FISD dataset, I make a few changes on the
bond characteristics based on my judgments. For relatively low-quantity bonds, I observe
the recorded action as “E” (entire issue called), “P” (part of issue called), or “B” (balance
of issue called). However, these bond provisions do not include callables (i.e., the callable
indicator shows not callable). Therefore, these bonds are marked as callable.9 Callable
9

I contacted the dataset administrators, and they informed us that these bonds should be callable and
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convertible bonds are excluded for improved empirical analysis. The primary reason is that
call options on convertible bonds serve different functions that limit investors’ conversion
behaviors. The call option could be used to force conversion if necessary. Papers, including
Grundy & Verwijmeren (2018), have discussed this issue in detail. Furthermore, callable
and convertible bonds are excluded from the analysis because they serve a major function
as convertible bonds. I check the bond issuance information against SDC bond issuances,
which provide the period of call protection on fixed-price callable debt. In my dataset, bonds
can only have either make-whole or fixed-price calls because these provisions are mutually
exclusive.
Firm-level bond data are merged with the Compustat dataset of US public firm accounting data to obtain a total sample of 225,703 bonds, among which 38% are callable. After
matching with Compustat firm identifiers, 32,823 matches were compiled, of which 60% are
callable.
Table 3.1 presents a summary statistics of bond characteristics and holdings. The following are presented: cash holdings, book leverage (BLev), short-term leverage (ST Lev),
long-term leverage (LT Lev), market-to-book ratio (M B), size, tangibility , cash flow, research and developments (RD), capital expenditures (CP X), net working capital (N W C)
excluding cash and short-term liabilities, zero-leverage dummy, dividend dummy (DivDM ),
fixed-price callable dummy (CallDM ), make-whole callable dummy (M W DM ), credit rating dummy, and speculative-grade dummy. Cash holding is defined as cash and short-term
investments scaled by the book value of total asset. Short-term leverage is the book value
of short-term debt divided by the book value of total assets. Long-term leverage is the book
value long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets. Definitions of “short-term”
and “long-term” follow Compustat’s definition . “Leverage ratio” is defined as the sum of
short-term and long-term leverage. MB is the market value divided by book value of total
assets. “Size” is defined as the natural logarithm of the consumer price index-adjusted total
that the indictor is an error. Excluding these bonds from the sample does not alter the results qualitatively.
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assets in 1980 USD. Tangibility is the book value of property, plant, and equipment scaled
by the book value of total assets. Cash flow represents a firm’s operating cash flow scaled
by lagged assets. RD is the ratio of RD expenses to total sales. CP X represents capital
expenses scaled by the book value of total assets. N W C is calculated as current assets (less
cash and short-term investments) minus current liabilities (less short-term debt), scaled by
the book value of total assets. Zero-leverage dummy is an indicator set to the value of 1 for
firms with zero book leverage and 0 otherwise. Dividend dummy is an indicator set to 1 for
firms’ payout dividends and 0 otherwise. CallDM is an indicator set to 1 for firms having
fixed-price callable debt and 0 otherwise. M W DM is an indicator set to 1 for firms having
make-whole callable debt and 0 otherwise. Credit rating dummy is an indicator set to 1 for
firms having credit ratings and 0 for all other observations. Speculative-grade dummy is an
indicator set to 1 for firms having speculative-grade investment ratings and 0 otherwise.10
Overall, 84,265 firm-year observations are included in the sample. An average cash
holding level of 17% of total assets are observed across all firm-year observations. Leverage
ratio measure averages at 0.22, with 0.04 short-term leverage and 0.18 long-term leverage.
Figure 1 a shows time-series trend of cash holdings, total leverage, short-term leverage, and
long-term leverage. Cash holdings and leverage measures across 1980–2018 have a negative
relationship. Long-term leverage has a higher correlation with total leverage, whereas shortterm leverage remains more persistent over the sample period. Thus, fixed-year effects
are controlled in the empirical analysis to avoid capturing the time-series effects instead
of cross-sectional effects. Firm accounting characteristics, such as size (natural logarithm
of total assets), M B, tangibility, cash flow, RD, CP X, and N W C, are similar to those
of previous financial studies. A total of 13% of the firm-year observations include firms
with zero leverage, and 43% comprises dividend payout. Fixed-price calls are held by 12%
of the firms, and make-whole calls are smaller, averaging at 6%. Consistent with market
observations, 20% of firms have credit ratings, of which 10% (50% conditionally) are rated
10

A complete list of variables used is shown in Appendix A
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speculative investment grade.

3.4.2.

Empirical Model

The empirical model in this chapter follows those of Opler et al. (1999) and Graham
& Leary (2018) in determining target cash levels. The trade-off theory of cash holding
predicts that firms have a target cash holding level because holding cash entails costs (i.e.,
investment opportunity costs) and benefits (i.e., precautionary intentions). Control variables
similar to those of Graham & Leary (2018) are included, cash holding levels on lagged firm
characteristics are regressed as follows:
CashHoldingi,t+1 =β1 IndCashi,t + β2 M Bi,t + β3 Sizei,t + β4 T angibilityi,t
+ β5 CashF lowi,t + β6 R&Di,t + β7 CP Xi,t + β8 Levi,t

(10)

+ β9 N W Ci,t + β10 DivDMi,t + i,t ,
IndCash denotes average cash holding level of industries defined by the North American
Industry Classification System in two digits. Each variable denotes the accounting number
in firm i and fiscal year t. Firms are clustered to adjust for heteroscedasticity.
Book leverage is separated into short-term and long-term leverage to test their differential
impacts on cash holdings as follows:

CashHoldingi,t+1 = β1 ST Levi,t + β2 LT Levi,t + Xi,t β + i,t ,

(11)

where Xi,t represents firm characteristics.
Dummy variables are added to the regression to test the impact of leverage on cash
holdings under different circumstances as follows:

CashHoldingi,t+1 = β1 Levi,t + Di,t × LT Levi,t + Di,t + Xi,t β + i,t ,
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(12)

CashHoldingi,t+1 =β1 ST Levi,t + β1 LT Levi,t + Di,t × ST LT Levi,t
(13)
+ Di,t × LT Levi,t + Di,t + Xi,t β + i,t ,
where Di,t represents dummy variables that follow my definition and Xi,t represents firm
characteristics. The coefficients on Di,t × Levi,t and Di,t are tested for significance, direction,
and magnitudes for additional effects.
The next empirical model regresses changes in cash on firm characteristics to evaluate
the leverage effect on cash restoration. Cash holding level is controlled in the regression as
follows:
∆CashHoldingi,t+1 = β1 Cashholdingi,t + β2 Levi,t + Xi,t β + i,t ,
∆CashHoldingi,t+1 = β1 Cashholdingi,t + β2 ST Levi,t + β2 LT Levi,t + Xi,t β + i,t ,

3.5.

(14)
(15)

Cash-Leverage Sensitivities across Leverage Levels and Different Types of Debt

This section presents empirical results to test the impacts of different leverage levels and
debt types on cash holding policies. Column 1 of Table 3.2 shows the baseline model results.
Firms’ cash holdings and book leverage have a strong and negative relationship. Industry
mean positively impacts cash holdings, indicating an industry effect. The coefficients on M B
show that firms with higher growth opportunities hold more cash. It could be interpreted
as overvalued firms hold more cash. Larger firms have fewer concerns about raising funds
and thus hold less cash. Firms with more physical collateral (i.e., tangibility) hold less
cash. Cash flow increases cash holdings on average. Almeida, Campello & Weisbach (2004)
argued that firms with fewer financial constraints did not exhibit this sensitivity. This finding
is confirmed in the analysis. Firms with high RD also have high cash holdings for future
needs. CP X exhausts cash holdings. Firms with more N W C have low cash holding benefits.
Dividend payers hold less cash compared with non-dividend payers. The regression results
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are qualitatively consistent with Graham & Leary (2018).
Zero-leverage dummy is added to the regression in column 2 of Table 3.2 because nontrivial firms have zero leverage (13%). Negative cash–leverage sensitivity could be driven
by zero-leveraged firms holding positive cash level. Although coefficients on other variables have similar properties, a substantial magnitude of increased cash holdings is observed
within zero-leveraged firms. On average, zero-leveraged firms hold 0.09 more cash than
positively leveraged firms, compared with an average cash holding level of 0.17. Moreover,
cash–leverage sensitivity decreases from 0.20 to 0.14 after controlling for zero-leveraged firms
and remain significantly negative. These results suggest that managers prefer to hold cash
and maintain low leverage levels, hence supporting the hypotheses that emphasize managerial preferences or agency costs of managerial discretion. The results here are mostly
consistent with hypothesis 7.A. The decrease in cash–leverage sensitivity after controlling
for zero-leveraged firms is substantial but not complete. Further analyses are conducted
to explore other potential channels that lead to negative cash–leverage relationship while
controlling for zero-leveraged firms.
Firms’ book leverage is divided into short-term and long-term leverage as shown in column 3 of Table 3.2. Column 4 shows the results controlled for zero leverage. Short-term and
long-term leverages show different sensitivities to cash holdings. Firms with short-term debt
market access show higher absolute leverage sensitivities than those with long-term debt
market access, hence supporting hypothesis 7.B. Short-term debt is a closer substitute for
cash than long-term debt and further reduces cash holding benefits (transaction costs and
precautionary motives). Firms with short-term debt market access are less likely to hold cash
at comparable leverage levels. Although long-term leverage exhibits lower absolute magnitude of sensitivity, the coefficient is strongly negative and significant. This finding suggests
that other channels could drive cash–leverage sensitivity in addition to liquidity motives.
Such channels are important in understanding the leverage impacts on cash holdings.
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The results also suggest that managers do not consider debt as a perfect substitute for
cash because leverage sensitivity on is significantly different from 1. Short-term leverage has
a higher magnitude in the coefficient than long-term leverage, indicating that short-term
debt is a closer substitute for cash than long-term debt. However, such coefficients are far
from 1 (0.18 and 0.13 on short-term and long-term debt, respectively). Cash preference over
debt agrees with the predictions of financial hierarchy theory. The coefficient magnitudes
suggest that other mechanisms on negative cash–leverage sensitivity require explorations.

3.6.

Access to Debt Market

This section tests of whether firms with credit market access influence cash–leverage
relationship. Credit rating dummy is added to the model with leverage measures to further
explore access to debt markets. Credit-rated firms have better debt market access with
more borrowing options and lower rates, such as corporate bonds. Table 3.3 shows the
first set of results. In column 1, credit-rated firms hold significantly less cash than noncredit-rated firms. Moreover, positive coefficients are observed on interaction terms of credit
ratings and leverages. With credit ratings, cash–leverage sensitivities are largely reduced.
Credit-rated firms have a cash–leverage sensitivity of 0.07, whereas non-rated firms have a
cash–leverage sensitivity of 0.17, which is more than twice the coefficient of rated firms. In
Column 2, leverage measures are separated, which have higher effects on short-term debt.
This finding is consistent with the present study’s liquidity motive hypotheses. Short-term
leverage and cash sensitivity is reduced from 0.20 to 0.05 from non-rated to rated firms.
Long-term leverage sensitivity on cash is more comparable with the total leverage. The
different sensitivity changes indicate that better credit market access, particularly shortterm markets, reduces cash–leverage sensitivities. The results are consistent with the second
set of hypotheses in this chapter (hypotheses 6.A and 6.B. Firms with better access to debt
market hold less cash and exhibit lower cash–leverage sensitivities, holding everything else
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constant.
Credit-rated firms are further divided into investment grade and speculative grade. Table 3.4 shows consistent results. Both types of credit-rated firms exhibit low cash holding
levels and less magnitude in the cash–leverage sensitivity. This finding indicates that creditrated firms do not influence the results in Table 3.3. Dispersions in cash holding levels and
cash–leverage sensitivities between investment-grade firms and speculative-grade firms are
sensible. The results show that speculative-grade firms hold less cash than non-rated firms,
whereas investment-grade firms hold less cash than speculative-grade firms. Cash–leverage
sensitivities on total debt, short-term debt, and long-term debt ratios are all ranked as nonrated firms, speculative-grade firms, and investment-grade firms by magnitudes. However,
investment- and speculative-grade firms have small differences in cash–leverage sensitivity
on total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio.
To test the significances of differences in such coefficients, similar regressions are further
conducted in the subsample of credit-rated firms. Table 3.5 shows the results. Speculativegrade firms have no significant impacts on total leverage or long-term leverage. A significant
positive interaction coefficient is observed on short-term leverage but not on long long-term
leverage. Cash–leverage sensitivity on short-term debt for speculative firms is significantly
low (0.03).
The interpretations of the above results are as follows. First, firms with credit market
access have fewer problems in raising cash. Therefore, they hold lower cash levels, all else
being equal. Diminishing concerns increase with credit ratings. Cash–leverage sensitivities
are lower for credit-rated firms (both investment grade and speculative grade), suggesting
that debt capacity variation within each group is likely much smaller than within the unrated subsample. It is noteworthy that speculative-grade firms exhibit low magnitude of
cash–leverage sensitivity, particularly on short-term leverage. Speculative-grade firms are
found to have high leverage levels. They are likely to have exhausted their debt capacity,
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leading to a low variation in cash holdings regardless of their leverage levels.

3.7.

Financial Flexibility

This section tests how financial flexibility impacts the cash–leverage relationship. Two
indicators are used to proxy for financial flexibility. First, the KZ index introduced by
Kaplan & Zingales (1997) is used to study cash–leverage sensitivity across different financially
constrained firms. The slack component in the index is excluded to avoid cash effects on the
constraints and thus form a reliable analysis. The KZ index is computed as follows:

KZIndex = 1.002 × CashF low39.368 × Dividend + 3.139 × Leverage + 0.283 × Q, (16)

Firms are sorted each year based on their KZ indices, and dummy variable KZDMi,t is
created to denote firms’ ranks. KZDMi,t is set to a value of 1 if firms are in the top 50% in
the fiscal year and 0 otherwise. The top 50% of the KZ index indicates a higher financial
constraint. The KZ index interacts with leverage variables following the empirical model
of Eqs. 12 and 13. Table 3.6 presents the results. On average, financially constrained firms
hold less cash. This condition is because financially constrained firms experience difficulty in
generating cash flows and raising funds. Their cash–leverage sensitivities are substantially
lower compared with less financially constrained firms. This finding suggests that financially
constrained firms tend to hold more cash as leverage increases. The results are consistent with
the findings in Chen et al. (2017), Acharya et al. (2007), and Hovakimian & Titman (2003).
The results also hold for total leverage, short-term leverage, and long-term leverage and agree
with the hypothesis that negative cash–leverage sensitivity is mainly driven financial flexible
firms that maintain high cash levels and low leverage levels (hypothesis ??). Managers in
such firms strategically maintain financial flexibility to maximize shareholders’ wealth or
satisfy individual interests.
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Next, firm leverage levels proxy for financial flexibility. Lemmon & Zender (2010) and
Shleifer & Vishny (1992) documented debt capacity effects on firms’ financing. Firms with
sufficient debt capacity are financially flexible. Underleveraged firms (firms below their
leverage target) have more debt capacity than overleveraged firms (firms above their leverage target). The financial leverage target is estimated using a 5-year rolling overlapping
subsamples of data. Figure 3.2 illustrates the timing convention that I follow. For each
firm-year, the target leverage ratio, Levit∗ , is obtained as an out-of-sample predicted value
from the following estimation model, estimated over the previous 5 years, t-1 to t-511 :
Levi,t =β0i + β1 × Sizei,t + β2 × T angibilityi,t + β3 × R&Di,t
(17)
+ β4 × RDDi,t + β5 × M Bi,t + i,t+1
This approach allows us to incorporate fixed firm effects that vary over time, which was found
to be important by DeAngelo & Roll (2015). Dummy variable T argetDMi,t is created to
represent whether a firm i is above or below its leverage target in fiscal year t. T argetDMi,t
is set to a value of 1 if a firm is above or equal to its estimated leverage target, and 0 if it
is below. The target dummy interacts with leverages and presents the results in Table 3.7.
Results were similar to financial constraints. First, firms above their leverage targets hold
less cash and exhibit lower cash–leverage sensitivity in total leverage, short-term leverage,
and long-term leverage. Thus, cash–leverage sensitivity is significantly reduced. The results
imply that negative cash–leverage sensitivity is primarily driven by firms that remain below
their target leverage ratios. Such firms intend to maintain financial flexibility to maximize
shareholders’ wealth or satisfy managers’ private interests. Therefore, the results are not
consistent with the argument that highly leveraged firms may drive cash–leverage sensitivity
due to high interest payments. Firms above their leverage targets usually have high debt
costs and hold more cash as leverage rises.
11

∗
For each Levit
, I require a minimum of two observations per firm during the applicable estimation period.
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3.8.

Testing the Wealth-transfer Mechanism

An additional theoretical mechanism that has rarely been empirically tested is applied in
this chapter. Agency cost of debt (i.e., debt overhang) is predicted to impact cash–leverage
sensitivity. As cash level increases, firms are less exposed to financial distress risk. Thus,
firms’ outstanding debt value increases, inducing wealth transfer from shareholders to debtholders. Such effects are higher when long-term debt is outstanding because long-term debtholders are the primary beneficiaries of such wealth transfers. Consequently, this debt overhang
problem prevents firms from reserving cash. The first-order result depicts a negative relationship between cash and long-term leverage. However, this relationship should be interpreted
with caution because liquidity motive can also explain the results. Fixed-price calls are
selected as an instrument to isolate non-liquidity effects. Fixed-price calls can effectively
limit wealth transfer by capping the price of firms’ outstanding bonds following Bodie &
Taggart (1978) and Barnea et al. (1980). By integrating Mergent FISD and SDC datasets,
firms’ statuses in holding fixed-price callable bonds are identified in the sample period of
1980–2018. The callable dummy, which is set to 1 if firms hold fixed-price callable debt and
0 otherwise, interact with firm leverages. Credit ratings are controlled in the regressions
because corporate bonds are likely to be impacted by firms’ credit ratings as shown in Table
3.8. Holding callable debt is observed to further reduce cash–leverage sensitivities. Although
a credit rating grants firms with a cash–leverage sensitivity of 0.07, callable debt increases
the effect by adding 0.06 to cash–leverage sensitivity. This effect contributes a statistically
significant nontrivial part of cash–leverage sensitivities.
Book leverage is divided into short-term and long-term leverage, and leverage measures
interact with the callable dummy. Consequently, the results are consistent with the hypotheses. Column 2 of Table 3.8 shows the results. Similar results are observed on credit
rating and speculative rating dummies. Fixed-price call effect is observed predominantly on
long-term leverage but not on short-term leverage. The results of total leverage before are
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primarily driven by long-term leverage effect, hence supporting the hypothesis that fixedprice calls impact firms’ cash–leverage sensitivity via long-term leverage. Fixed-price calls
reduce the agency costs of holding cash regarding debt outstanding. Thus, firms have higher
propensity to hold cash.

3.9.
3.9.1.

Robustness Tests
Make-Whole Provision Test

Two sets of robustness tests are conducted to mitigate concerns of alternative explanations and the endogeneity problem. By testing the implications of Barnea et al. (1980),
wealth transfer influences cash–leverage relationship. However, fixed-price calls offer firms
two privileges, namely, the call option and fixed price. The impact of fixed-price calls on
cash–leverage relationship could arise due to the call option rather than the fixed price.
Previous studies documented how call options grant firms more financial flexibility (Mann
& Powers (2003)), which may influence the outcome. Another provision (i.e., make-whole
calls) is integrated into this present study. A make-whole call is a provision that only has
the call option. However, firms must repurchase bonds at market prices. A make-whole
provision is a pure call option added to a straight bond. Mergent FISD provides information
on make-whole periods. After issuance, a make-whole bond remains callable at market price
for a particular period. After the make-whole period, fixed-price calls take over the provision
if the bond is not matured. Thus, the make-whole provision provides an ideal setting to test
whether the call option impacts cash–leverage sensitivities.
Table 3.9 presents the results using make-whole calls. Dummy M W DMi,t is generated to
identify firms with make-whole call bonds. The dummy interact with the leverage measures.
After controlling for the make-whole provision, the interaction item of fixed-price calls and
firm leverage measures remains statistically significant, and the magnitude of the coefficient
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stays close (0.0628 vs. 0.0634). A noticeable change in the coefficient is not observed. On the
contrary, the make-whole call has neither statistical significance nor high point estimation.
In Column 2, short-term leverage and long-term leverage measures are used in the regression,
and the results are robust.

3.9.2.

Economic Recession Test

An economic recession experiment is also conducted to test the robustness of cash–leverage
sensitivities, liquidity channels, and wealth transfer channels. First, cash holdings and leverage measures are well-documented as endogenous variables that are determined by firm
characteristics. In addition to numerous control variables in this chapter, unobserved variables and channels that drive cash–leverage sensitivity may be overlooked. An external
shock of an economic recession to firms’ capital structure and profitability serves a plausible robustness test of the results. Firms’ cash–leverage sensitivities are predicted to remain
consistent across business cycles, hence mitigating the endogeneity concern. Second, an
economic shock weakens the external financing market, making it difficult to finance via
borrowing. The liquidity channel is tested whether it agrees with the predictions in an economic recession. Third, firms face more severe debt overhang when exposed to interest rate
risk. If the wealth transfer mechanism is plausible, then higher cash–leverage sensitivity
impacts from the fixed-price callable debt should be observed.
Recession-cycle months are defined following the NBER definition and firms as having
been in a macroeconomic recession if at least 1 month of a firm’s fiscal year interacted with
a recession period. Table 3.10 presents the results. The sample is divided into non-recession
(column 1) and recession subsamples (column 2). In the two subsamples, cash–leverage
sensitivities are comparable, and a difference test on the coefficient reports no significance.
Credit rating has a higher impact during non-recession years compared with recession years,
indicating lower external debt market access. The difference test on the credit–leverage in-
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teraction is significant. The fixed-price callable debt induces lower cash–leverage sensitivities
during recession years, and the difference is significant.
Columns 3 and 4 show consistent results of the separation of leverage measures. Interestingly, long-term leverage is more affected and influences cash–leverage sensitivities. These
results survive the external shock test. Therefore, the predictions of this chapter about
cash–leverage mechanisms hold true. Furthermore, robustness tests add evidence that firms
tend to hold less cash when the leverage level is higher due to wealth transfer mechanism.
Cash holdings increase outstanding debt value, leading to wealth transfer from shareholders
to debtholders.

3.10.

Cash Restoration

Relationship of difference in cash holding and leverage is tested, and results are presented
in Table 3.11. The change in cash levels is regressed on leverages, cash holdings, and other
firm characteristics. A few key results are noticeable. First, leverage negatively relates to
the change in cash reserves, supporting hypothesis 7.B. However, the coefficients are small.
These coefficients are the interest effect, from which firms hold higher debt levels and thus
must pay more interest on the outstanding debt. The magnitude is approximately 0.03,
which is much smaller than the leverage on the level effect at 0.14 in the baseline regression.
A much weaker channel regarding mechanical hypothesis about cash–leverage sensitivities
is observed. When the book leverage is divided into short-term leverage and long-term
leverage, the results support my argument. Unlike previous statistics, the coefficient on
the long-term leverage is higher than that on the short-term leverage due to higher interest
paid on outstanding long-term debt. Changes in cash holdings and cash holdings have a
strongly negative relationship. This effect may indicate that as firms hold more cash, they
accumulate less cash. Jiang & Lie (2016) accounted for this effect as the speed of cash
holdings adjustment. Therefore, an interest payment mechanism exists, but the effect is
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relatively minor.

3.11.

Conclusion

This chapter explores the impacts of firms’ leverage on their cash holdings. Previous
financial literature documented a strongly negative effect of this relationship but diverged
greatly with their explanations. Several potential channels are tested that lead to a negative relationship. The empirical results show that firms maintain high cash levels and low
leverages, promoting negative cash–leverage sensitivities. Such behavior can be explained
by (1) cash preference over debt financing due to cash holding benefits; (2) firms’ financial
flexibility; and (3) managerial discretion. The results are not consistent with the argument
that highly leverage firms exhibit low cash levels, such as the debt service payments reduce
firms’ cash holdings.
A new channel is documented that originates from the agency cost of debt. The wealth
transfer channel is shown to be nontrivial. Increasing cash holdings raises outstanding debt
values and wealth transfers from shareholders to debtholders. Therefore, firms with more
outstanding debt, particularly fixed-price callable debt, hold less cash on average. The
documented results survive various robustness tests.
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Figure 3.1. Leverage and Cash Holding Trend
This figure presents the book total leverage, book short-term leverage, and book long-term
leverage trends across 1980 to 2018. Firms’ average cash holding level is presented.
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Figure 3.2. Leverage Target Prediction
The figure presents the timing convention for OLS regressions of leverage on a set of firm
characteristics, to estimate target leverage ratios. Time-varying target leverage ratios in
year (t) are calculated as the predicted values based on the parameter estimates obtained
from rolling fixed effects regression (1), estimated over the previous five years (t-1) through
(t-5). The sample firms are from Compustat. Leverage targets are estimated for years 1980
to 2018. The first estimation period starts in 1975.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
The sample firms are from Compustat and sample period spans from 1980 to 2018. Cash holding ratio is
the cash holding divided by book value of total assets. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and longterm debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is short-term debt divided by assets.
Long-term leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. Industry average is the average level of cash holding
within industry defined by the first two digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted
total assets. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed assets in total assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense
over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow
ratio is the cash flow divided by total assets. CP X is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. OW C
is the net working capital divided by total assets excluding cash and short-term liabilities. CreditDM is an
indicator set to one for firms with credit ratings and zero for all other observations. DivDm is an indicator
set to one for firms which pay out dividends and zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set
to one for firms with fix-price callable debt and zero for all other observations. M W DM is an indicator set
to one for firms with make-whole callable debt and zero for all other observations.
Variable
CashHolding
BLev
ST Lev
LT Lev
MB
Size
T angibility
CashF low
R&D
CP X
NW C
ZeroLevDM
DivDM
CallDM
M W DM
CreditRatingDM
SpeculativeDM

N
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
84,265
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Mean
0.17
0.22
0.04
0.18
1.72
4.61
0.31
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.15
0.13
0.43
0.12
0.06
0.20
0.10

Median
0.08
0.21
0.02
0.15
1.35
4.49
0.24
0.08
0.00
0.05
0.13
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Std.
0.21
0.19
0.08
0.17
1.13
2.15
0.24
0.17
0.14
0.08
0.22
0.33
0.50
0.33
0.24
0.40
0.30

Table 3.2: Testing Cash Holding with Access to Debt Market
This table presents the results of regression of cash holding on lagged values of the independent variables.
The sample firms are from Compustat and sample period spans from 1980 to 2018. Cash holding ratio
is the cash holding divided by book value of total assets. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and
long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is short-term debt divided by
assets. Long-term leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. Zero leverage dummy is a dummy variable
set to one if a firms’ leverage ratio is zero, and zero otherwise. Industry average is the average level of
cash holding within industry defined by the first two digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm
of CPI-adjusted total assets. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed assets in total assets. R&D is the
ratio of R&D expense over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets over the book
value of assets. Cash flow ratio is the cash flow divided by total assets. CP X is the capital expenditures
divided by total assets. OW C is the net working capital divided by total assets excluding cash and
short-term liabilities. CreditDM is an indicator set to one for firms with credit ratings and zero for all
other observations. DivDM is an indicator set to one for firms which pay out dividends and zero for all
other observations. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level
clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
Dependent Variable:
BLevi,t

(1)
CashHoldingi,t+1

(2)
CashHoldingi,t+1

-0.1992***
(-40.44)

-0.1438***
(-31.31)

ST Levi,t
LT Levi,t
ZeroLevi,t
IndCashi,t
M/Bi,t
Sizei,t
T N Gi, t
CashF lowi,t
R&Di,t
CP Xi,t
OW Ci,t
DivDMi,t
Cluster
Fixed effects
Obs
Adjusted R2

0.0910***
(6.12)
0.0169***
(17.87)
-0.0124***
(-19.99)
-0.1742***
(-30.93)
0.0541***
(7.42)
0.3589***
(36.97)
-0.0865***
(-10.25)
-0.2850***
(-40.04)
-0.0184***
(-8.67)
Firm
Year
84,265
0.51

0.0929***
(26.50)
0.0943***
(6.75)
0.0152***
(16.72)
-0.0101***
(-17.66)
-0.1672***
(-31.23)
0.0440***
(6.20)
0.3489***
(36.74)
-0.0672***
(-8.30)
-0.2662***
(-39.16)
-0.0184***
(-9.27)
Firm
Year
84,265
0.53
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(3)
CashHoldingi,t+1

(4)
CashHoldingi,t+1

-0.2526***
(-25.05)
-0.1838***
(-36.54)

-0.1837***
(-19.78)
-0.1329***
(-27.85)
0.0926***
(26.46)
0.0927***
(6.64)
0.0154***
(17.05)
-0.0105***
(-18.18)
-0.1685***
(-31.51)
0.0400***
(5.57)
0.3475***
(36.65)
-0.0682***
(-8.45)
-0.2628***
(-38.08)
-0.0185***
(-9.35)
Firm
Year
84,265
0.53

0.0888***
(5.98)
0.0172***
(18.32)
-0.0128***
(-20.64)
-0.1760***
(-31.29)
0.0486***
(6.61)
0.3570***
(36.85)
-0.0878***
(-10.45)
-0.2804***
(-38.93)
-0.0185***
(-8.76)
Firm
Year
84,265
0.51

Table 3.3: Testing Cash with Access to Debt Market
This table presents the results of regression of cash holding on lagged values of the independent variables.
The sample firms are from Compustat and sample period spans from 1980 to 2018. Cash holding ratio is the
cash holding divided by book value of total assets. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and long-term
debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is short-term debt divided by assets. Longterm leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. CreditDM is an indicator set to one for firms with credit
ratings and zero for all other observations. The regression is controlled for zero leverage dummy, industry
average cash holdings, size, tangibility, R&D, market to book, cash flow, capital expenditures, net working
capital and dividend dummy. Zero leverage dummy is a dummy variable set to one if a firms’ leverage ratio
is zero, and zero otherwise. Industry average is the average level of cash holding within industry defined by
the first two digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted total assets. Tangibility is
the proportion of fixed assets in total assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense over sales. Market-to-book
is the ratio of market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow ratio is the cash flow divided
by total assets. CP X is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. OW C is the net working capital
divided by total assets excluding cash and short-term liabilities. DivDM is an indicator set to one for firms
which pay out dividends and zero for all other observations. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars
(**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
Dependent Variable:
BLevi,t
BLevi,t × CreditDMi,t

(1)
CashHoldingi,t+1
-0.1667***
(-31.73)
0.0990***
(11.14)

ST Levi,t
ST Levi,t × CreditDMi,t
LT Levi,t
LT Levi,t × CreditDMi,t
CreditDMi,t
Controls
Cluster
Fixed Effects
Obs.
Adjusted
adjusted R2

(2)
CashHoldingi,t+1

-0.0363***
(-9.26)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.53
0.51
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-0.2024***
(-20.04)
0.1537***
(-27.41)
-0.1530***
(8.59)
0.0854***
(9.39)
-0.0351***
(-9.03)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.53
0.53

Table 3.4: Testing Cash Holding with Access to Debt Market (Split Credit Ratings)
This table presents the results of regression of cash holding on lagged values of the independent variables.
The sample firms are from Compustat and sample period spans from 1980 to 2018. Cash holding ratio
is the cash holding divided by book value of total assets. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and
long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is short-term debt divided by
assets. Long-term leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. InvDM is an indicator set to one for firms
with credit ratings equal or better than BBB and zero for all other observations. SpeDM is an indicator
set to one for firms with credit ratings less than BBB and zero for all other observations. The regression
is controlled for zero leverage dummy, industry average cash holdings, size, tangibility, R&D, market to
book, cash flow, capital expenditures, net working capital and dividend dummy. Zero leverage dummy is
a dummy variable set to one if a firms’ leverage ratio is zero, and zero otherwise. Industry average is the
average level of cash holding within industry defined by the first two digit of NAICS code. Size is the
natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted total assets. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed assets in total assets.
R&D is the ratio of R&D expense over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets over
the book value of assets. Cash flow ratio is the cash flow divided by total assets. CP X is the capital
expenditures divided by total assets. OW C is the net working capital divided by total assets excluding cash
and short-term liabilities. DivDM is an indicator set to one for firms which pay out dividends and zero for
all other observations. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level
clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
Dependent Variable:
BLevi,t
BLevi,t × InvDMi,t
BLevi,t × SpeDMi,t

(1)
CashHoldingi,t+1
-0.1672***
(-31.84)
0.0943***
(6.55)
0.0796***
(7.30)

ST Levi,t
ST Levi,t × InvDMi,t
ST Levi,t × SpeDMi,t
LT Levi,t
LT Levi,t × InvDMi,t
LT Levi,t × SpeDMi,t
InvDMi,t
SpeDMi,t
Controls
Cluster
Fixed Effect
Obs.
Adjusted R2

(2)
CashHoldingi,t+1

-0.0416***
(-8.15)
-0.0224***
(-4.24)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.54
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-0.2008***
(-19.90)
0.0754**
(2.33)
0.1816***
(9.76)
-0.1546***
(-27.55)
0.0889***
(6.04)
0.0634***
(5.73)
-0.0393***
(-7.72)
-0.0218***
(-4.19)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.54

Table 3.5: Testing Cash Holding with Access to Debt Market (Subsample)
This table presents the results of regression of cash holding on lagged values of the independent variables in
the sample of firms with credit ratings. The sample firms are from Compustat and sample period spans from
1980 to 2018. Cash holding ratio is the cash holding divided by book value of total assets. Leverage ratio is
the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is shortterm debt divided by assets. Long-term leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. SpeDM is an indicator
set to one for firms with credit ratings less than BBB and zero for all other observations. The regression is
controlled for zero leverage dummy, industry average cash holdings, size, tangibility, RD, market to book,
cash flow, capital expenditures, net working capital and dividend dummy. Zero leverage dummy is a dummy
variable set to one if a firms’ leverage ratio is zero, and zero otherwise. Industry average is the average level
of cash holding within industry defined by the first two digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm
of CPI-adjusted total assets. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed assets in total assets. R&D is the ratio of
R&D expense over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets over the book value of assets.
Cash flow ratio is the cash flow divided by total assets. CP X is the capital expenditures divided by total
assets. OW C is the net working capital divided by total assets excluding cash and short-term liabilities.
DivDM is an indicator set to one for firms which pay out dividends and zero for all other observations.
The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start
(*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
Dependent Variable:
BLevi,t
BLevi,t × SpeDMi,t

(1)
CashHoldingi,t+1
-0.1074***
(-8.28)
0.0127
(0.81)

ST Levi,t
ST Levi,t × SpeDMi,t
LT Levi,t
LT Levi,t × SpeDMi,t
SpeDMi,t
Controls
Cluster
Fixed Effects
Obs.
Adjusted

(2)
CashHoldingi,t+1

0.0208***
(3.29)
Yes
Firm
Year
23,079
0.38
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-0.1584***
(-5.59)
0.1196***
(3.68)
-0.1000***
(-7.46)
0.0030
(0.19)
0.0199***
(3.18)
Yes
Firm
Year
23,079
0.38

Table 3.6: Testing Cash Holding with Financial Constraints
This table presents the results of regression of cash holding on lagged values of the independent variables.
The sample firms are from Compustat and sample period spans from 1980 to 2018. Cash holding ratio is the
cash holding divided by book value of total assets. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and long-term
debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is short-term debt divided by assets. Longterm leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. KZ-Index is calculated following Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) excluding the cash component. The KZDM is a dummy variable that is set to one if firms are
in the top 50 percentile of KZ-Index each year, and zero otherwise. The regression is controlled for zero
leverage dummy, industry average cash holdings, size, tangibility, RD, market to book, cash flow, capital
expenditures, net working capital and dividend dummy. Zero leverage dummy is a dummy variable set to
one if a firms’ leverage ratio is zero, and zero otherwise. Industry average is the average level of cash holding
within industry defined by the first two digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted
total assets. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed assets in total assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense
over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow ratio
is the cash flow divided by total assets. CP X is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. OW C is the
net working capital divided by total assets excluding cash and short-term liabilities. DivDM is an indicator
set to one for firms which pay out dividends and zero for all other observations. The t-statistics reflect
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start (*) indicates significance
at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
Dependent Variable:
BLevi,t
BLevi,t × KZDMi,t

(1)
CashHoldingi,t+1
-0.2161***
(-24.21)
0.1315***
(13.79)

ST Levi,t
ST Levi,t × KZDMi,t
LT Levi,t
LT Levi,t × KZDMi,t
SpeDMi,t
Controls
Cluster
Fixed Effects
Obs.
Adjusted

(2)
CashHoldingi,t+1

-0.0432***
(-15.92)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.54
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-0.3269***
(-14.99)
0.2183***
(9.98)
-0.1991***
(-22.21)
0.1192***
(0.19)
-0.0441***
(-16.15)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.54

Table 3.7: Testing Cash Holding with Financial Flexibility
This table presents the results of regression of cash holding on lagged values of the independent variables.
The sample firms are from Compustat and sample period spans from 1980 to 2018. Cash holding ratio is the
cash holding divided by book value of total assets. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and long-term debt
divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is short-term debt divided by assets. Long-term
leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. Leverage target is estimated using five-year rolling fixed-effect
regresssion. The T argetDM is a dummy variable that is set to one if firms are above their estimated financial
leverage, and zero otherwise. The regression is controlled for zero leverage dummy, industry average cash
holdings, size, tangibility, RD, market to book, cash flow, capital expenditures, net working capital and
dividend dummy. Zero leverage dummy is a dummy variable set to one if a firms’ leverage ratio is zero, and
zero otherwise. Industry average is the average level of cash holding within industry defined by the first two
digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted total assets. Tangibility is the proportion
of fixed assets in total assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio
of market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow ratio is the cash flow divided by total
assets. CP X is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. OW C is the net working capital divided
by total assets excluding cash and short-term liabilities. DivDM is an indicator set to one for firms which
pay out dividends and zero for all other observations. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**)
5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
Dependent Variable:
BLevi,t
BLevi,t × T argetDMi,t

(1)
CashHoldingi,t+1
-0.2715***
(-26.76)
0.1670***
(16.34)

ST Levi,t
ST Levi,t × T argetDMi,t
LT Levi,t
LT Levi,t × T argetDMi,t
T argetDMi,t
Controls
Cluster
Fixed Effects
Obs.
Adjusted R2

(2)
CashHoldingi,t+1

-0.0341***
(-12.70)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.54
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-0.4370***
(-20.78)
0.3094***
(14.72)
-0.2408***
(-23.32)
0.1441***
(13.92)
-0.0361***
(-13.47)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.54

Table 3.8: Testing Cash with Wealth Transfer Mechanism
This table presents the results of regression of cash holding on lagged values of the independent variables.
The sample firms are from Compustat and sample period spans from 1980 to 2018. Cash holding ratio is
the cash holding divided by book value of total assets. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and longterm debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is short-term debt divided by assets.
Long-term leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. CreditDM is an indicator set to one for firms
with credit ratings and zero for all other observations. SpeDM is an indicator set to one for firms with
credit ratings less than BBB and zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for
firms with fixed-price callable debt and zero for all other observations. The regression is controlled for zero
leverage dummy, industry average cash holdings, size, tangibility, RD, market to book, cash flow, capital
expenditures, net working capital and dividend dummy. Zero leverage dummy is a dummy variable set to
one if a firms’ leverage ratio is zero, and zero otherwise. Industry average is the average level of cash holding
within industry defined by the first two digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted
total assets. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed assets in total assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense
over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow ratio
is the cash flow divided by total assets. CP X is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. OW C is the
net working capital divided by total assets excluding cash and short-term liabilities. DivDM is an indicator
set to one for firms which pay out dividends and zero for all other observations. The t-statistics reflect
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start (*) indicates significance
at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
Dependent Variable:
BLevi,t
BLevi,t × CreditDMi,t
BLevi,t × SpeDMi,t
BLevi,t × CallDMi,t

(1)
CashHoldingi,t+1
-0.1741***
(-33.24)
0.0766***
(5.31)
-0.0195
(-1.18)
0.0634***
(5.77)

(2)
CashHoldingi,t+1
ST BLevi,t
ST Levi,t × CreditDMi,t
ST Levi,t × SpeDMi,t
ST Levi,t × CallDMi,t
LT BLevi,t
LT Levi,t × CreditDMi,t
LT Levi,t × SpeDMi,t
LT Levi,t × CallDMi,t

CreditDMi,t
SpeDMi,t
CallDMi,t
Controls
Cluster
Fixed Effects
Obs.
Adjusted R2

-0.0385***
(-7.46)
0.0177***
(2.70)
-0.0007
(-0.14)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.53
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-0.2015***
(-19.67)
0.0657**
(2.01)
0.0951***
(2.83)
0.0317
(1.51)
-0.1632***
(-29.18)
0.0719***
(4.88)
-0.0295*
(-1.77)
0.0633***
(5.88)
-0.0368***
(-7.13)
0.0162**
(2.49)
0.0002
(0.03)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.53

Table 3.9: Testing Cash with Wealth Transfer Mechanism Robustness
This table presents the results of regression of cash holding on lagged values of the independent variables.
The sample firms are from Compustat and sample period spans from 1980 to 2018. Cash holding ratio is
the cash holding divided by book value of total assets. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and longterm debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is short-term debt divided by assets.
Long-term leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. CreditDM is an indicator set to one for firms
with credit ratings and zero for all other observations. SpeDM is an indicator set to one for firms with
credit ratings less than BBB and zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for
firms with fixed-price callable debt and zero for all other observations. M W DM is an indicator set to one
for firms with make-whole callable debt and zero for all other observations. The regression is controlled
for zero leverage dummy, industry average cash holdings, size, tangibility, RD, market to book, cash flow,
capital expenditures, net working capital and dividend dummy. Zero leverage dummy is a dummy variable
set to one if a firms’ leverage ratio is zero, and zero otherwise. Industry average is the average level of
cash holding within industry defined by the first two digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm of
CPI-adjusted total assets. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed assets in total assets. R&D is the ratio of
R&D expense over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets over the book value of assets.
Cash flow ratio is the cash flow divided by total assets. CP X is the capital expenditures divided by total
assets. OW C is the net working capital divided by total assets excluding cash and short-term liabilities.
DivDM is an indicator set to one for firms which pay out dividends and zero for all other observations.
The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start
(*) indicates significance at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
Dependent Variable:
BLevi,t
BLevi,t × CreditDMi,t
BLevi,t × SpeDMi,t
BLevi,t × CallDMi,t
BLevi,t × M W DMi,t

(1)
CashHoldingi,t+1
-0.1742***
(-33.21)
0.0782***
(5.40)
-0.0196
(-1.20)
0.0628***
(5.70)
-0.0053
(-0.35)

(2)
CashHoldingi,t+1
ST BLevi,t
ST Levi,t × CreditDMi,t
ST Levi,t × SpeDMi,t
ST Levi,t × CallDMi,t
ST Levi,t × M W DMi,t
LT BLevi,t
LT Levi,t × CreditDMi,t
LT Levi,t × SpeDMi,t
LT Levi,t × CallDMi,t
LT Levi,t × M W DMi,t

CreditDMi,t
SpeDMi,t
CallDMi,t
M W DMi,t
Controls
Cluster
Fixed Effects
Obs.
Adjusted R2

-0.0401***
(-7.75)
0.0182***
(2.79)
-0.0002
(-0.04)
0.0050
(0.84)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.53
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-0.2021***
(-19.68)
0.0615*
(1.81)
0.0957***
(2.81)
0.0329
(1.55)
0.0189
(0.51)
-0.1632***
(-29.14)
0.0737***
(5.01)
-0.0294*
(-1.79)
0.0626***
(5.81)
-0.0079
(-0.53)
-0.0382***
(-7.39)
0.0167**
(2.58)
0.0006
(0.13)
0.0050
(0.83)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.53
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Controls
Cluster
Fixed Effect
Obs.
Adjusted R2

CallDMi,t

SpeDMi,t

CallDMi,t

BLevi,t × CallDMi,t

BLevi,t × SpeDMi,t

BLevi,t × CreditDMi,t

BLevi,t

Dependent Variable:

-0.0387***
(-7.39)
0.0170**
(2.55)
0.0020
(0.39)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.53

-0.1721***
(-30.26)
0.0812***
(5.56)
-0.0194
(-1.16)
0.0589***
(4.87)

(1)
Non-Recession
CashHoldingi,t+1

-0.0369***
(-5.29)
0.0198**
(2.14)
-0.0092
(-1.53)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.54

-0.1786***
(-24.93)
0.0497**
(2.57)
-0.0172
(-0.75)
0.0807***
(5.48)

(2)
Recession
CashHoldingi,t+1

LT Levi,t × CallDMi,t

LT Levi,t × SpeDMi,t

LT Levi,t × CreditDMi,t

LT Levi,t

ST Levi,t × CallDMi,t

ST Levi,t × SpeDMi,t

ST Levi,t × CreditDMi,t

ST Levi,t

-0.1947***
(-16.75)
0.0800**
(2.35)
0.0928***
(2.64)
0.0278
(1.11)
-0.1626***
(-26.83)
0.0753***
(5.03)
-0.0277
(-1.64)
0.0592***
(5.03)
-0.0370***
(-7.09)
0.0155**
(2.36)
0.0027
(0.53)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.53

(3)
Non-Recession
CashHoldingi,t+1

-0.2183***
(-16.68)
-0.0039
(-0.09)
0.1248***
(2.70)
0.0521*
(1.91)
-0.1636***
(-21.16)
0.0512**
(2.53)
-0.0368
(-1.55)
0.0793***
(5.29)
-0.0350***
(-5.04)
0.0188**
(2.04)
-0.0081
(-1.38)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.54

(4)
Recession
CashHoldingi,t+1

This table presents the results of regression of cash holding on lagged values of the independent variables. The sample firms are from Compustat
and sample period spans from 1980 to 2018. Firms are defined to be in recession if at least one month in the fixcal year coincide with the recession
period defined by NBER economic cycles. Cash holding ratio is the cash holding divided by book value of total assets. Leverage ratio is the sum of
short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is short-term debt divided by assets. Long-term leverage is
long-term debt divided by assets. CreditDM is an indicator set to one for firms with credit ratings and zero for all other observations. SpeDM is an
indicator set to one for firms with credit ratings less than BBB and zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for firms with
fixed-price callable debt and zero for all other observations. The regression is controlled for zero leverage dummy, industry average cash holdings,
size, tangibility, RD, market to book, cash flow, capital expenditures, net working capital and dividend dummy. Zero leverage dummy is a dummy
variable set to one if a firms’ leverage ratio is zero, and zero otherwise. Industry average is the average level of cash holding within industry defined
by the first two digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted total assets. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed assets in total
assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow
ratio is the cash flow divided by total assets. CP X is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. OW C is the net working capital divided
by total assets excluding cash and short-term liabilities. DivDM is an indicator set to one for firms which pay out dividends and zero for all other
observations. The t-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start (*) indicates significance at
10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.

Table 3.10: Testing Cash with Wealth Transfer Mechanism Robustness

Table 3.11: Testing Cash with Wealth Transfer Mechanism
This table presents the results of regression of cash holding on lagged values of the independent variables.
The sample firms are from Compustat and sample period spans from 1980 to 2018. Cash holding ratio is
the cash holding divided by book value of total assets. Leverage ratio is the sum of short-term and longterm debt divided by the book value of assets. Short-term leverage is short-term debt divided by assets.
Long-term leverage is long-term debt divided by assets. CreditDM is an indicator set to one for firms
with credit ratings and zero for all other observations. SpeDM is an indicator set to one for firms with
credit ratings less than BBB and zero for all other observations. CallDM is an indicator set to one for
firms with fixed-price callable debt and zero for all other observations. The regression is controlled for zero
leverage dummy, industry average cash holdings, size, tangibility, RD, market to book, cash flow, capital
expenditures, net working capital and dividend dummy. Zero leverage dummy is a dummy variable set to
one if a firms’ leverage ratio is zero, and zero otherwise. Industry average is the average level of cash holding
within industry defined by the first two digit of NAICS code. Size is the natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted
total assets. Tangibility is the proportion of fixed assets in total assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D expense
over sales. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of assets over the book value of assets. Cash flow ratio
is the cash flow divided by total assets. CP X is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. OW C is the
net working capital divided by total assets excluding cash and short-term liabilities. DivDM is an indicator
set to one for firms which pay out dividends and zero for all other observations. The t-statistics reflect
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. One start (*) indicates significance
at 10% level, two stars (**) 5% and three starts (***) 1% level.
Dependent Variable:
CashHoldingi,t
BLevi,t

(1)
∆CashHoldingi,t+1

(2)
∆CashHoldingi,t+1

-0.2399***
(-53.25)
-0.0301***
(17.23)

-0.2397***
(-53.21)

ST Levi,t
LT Levi,t
Controls
Cluster
Fixed Effects
Obs.
Adjusted R2

(5.77)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.13
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-0.0268***
(-6.77)
-0.0302***
(-16.91)
Yes
Firm
Year
84,265
0.13

Appendix A.

Variable Definitions

Variable Name
Panel A: Compustat Items
CHE
ACT
LCT
PPENT
DLTT
OIBDP
DP
IB
PRCC
CSHO
DLC
XRD
PSTKRV
SALE
CAPX
SEQ
DVT

Definition
Cash and Short-Term Investments.
Total Current Assets.
Total Current Liabilities.
Property, Plant and Equipment.
Long-Term Debt.
Operating Income Before Depreciation.
Depreciation and Amortization.
Income Before Extraordinary Items.
Price Close - Annual.
Common Shares OUtstanding.
Debt in Current Liabilities.
Research and Development Expense
Preferred Stock/Redemption Value.
Sales/Turnover.
Capital Expenditures.
Shareholder’s Equity.
Dividends Total.

Panel B: Variable Constructions
CashHolding
Blev
ST Lev
LT Lev
MB
Size
T NG
CashF low
R&D
CP X
NW C
ROA

CHE/AT
(DLC + DLTT)/AT
DLC/AT
DLTT/AT
((AT - (SEQ - PSTKRV))+PRCC*CSHO)/AT
Log(Size)
PPENT/AT
(IB+DP)/l.AT
XRD/SALE
CAPX/l.AT
((ACT - CHE) - (LCT - DLC))/AT
OIBDP/l.AT
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